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Abstract 
Children's social cognitive understanding has been found to play a major role in shaping their 
social engagement and behaviour. It has been assumed that this understanding of the mind 
and emotion of others shapes the ways in which children go on to understand their own moral 
identity: their proclivities, sensitivities and responses to moral acts, but there appears to be a 
gap between the ways in which children talk about other people and the ways in which they 
talk about themselves. It was hypothesised that it is social engagement that shapes moral 
identity in young children rather than their understanding of other people. A longitudinal 
study of 115 six to seven year olds was run over two years examining these three features, 
self concept, socialisation and social cognition and their interactions over time. The study 
utilised child self-report measures and the validity and usefulness of such tools was also 
examined. It was found that as children progress through the first years of primary school 
their knowledge of the social world and their socialising agents is indeed related to behaviour 
concurrently and predicts positive social engagement one year later. However, there was no 
relationship found between social cognitive understanding and a child's developing moral self 
concept. It was found, in opposition with the traditional models of moral self concept, that 
children's social engagement at six shaped their moral self concept at seven rather than vice 
versa. These findings suggest that while children's skills in the domain of social cognition 
shape their pro-social behaviours this social engagement is influencing and shaping the ways 
in which these children view themselves as moral agents which may have important 
implications for children’s ongoing wellbeing.  
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Chapter 1: Literature Review 
While much of literature dealing with moral identity implies that moral identity 
shapes action, it can also be argued that social action and the evaluations such action 
receives, also shape identity. It has been traditionally proposed that a well-developed 
conscience is played out in social conduct, rule compliance, and concern for others, while 
those who show limited moral focus within their developing identity have been found to 
display antisocial behaviours, limited compliance, and problems with adaptive social 
functioning. Such relationships between identity and behaviour have been explored 
predominantly within adult samples but relations between identity and behaviour in 
childhood are less well understood. In fact, during early childhood it has been argued that 
social engagement has a profound influence on children’s developing moral sensibilities and 
motives, their conscience, and that this in turn influences their social engagement (Grusec, 
2006); which highlights bi-directional associations between these domains. When children 
enter a new social environment, for example school, they are confronted with many new 
sources of evaluation of their actions, which likely interacts with their emerging awareness of 
themselves as moral agents. By studying behaviour and identity formation within this 
transitional period, it is hoped that we can better understand the ways in which children’s 
environments provide experiences from which they build a sense of themselves as a moral 
actor, and how this sense of self feeds back into their socially competent interactions with 
peers.  
In this thesis, I will examine how children's developing moral self concept is related 
to their social engagement at school, as reported by teachers. School is a critical environment 
in which children establish relationships, manage conflicts, and navigate novel social 
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interactions. It is a socialising environment in which they begin to experience the social 
consequences of their own behaviour and receive broader feedback on their conduct from 
peers and teachers; their actions are evaluated as good or bad, nasty or kind, generous or 
mean, thoughtless or considered. Given that children of early school age are aware of moral 
concerns (Turiel & Killen, 2010), and have some awareness of their own moral sentiments 
(e.g. de Rosnay & Fink, 2011; Kochanska & Aksan, 2004), it is plausible that relations 
between children’s social conduct and their developing moral self concept will undergo 
important changes during the early years of school. Indeed, the broader self concept literature 
suggests that the period between six and eight years of age is an important period in which 
children gain an ability to both combine previously separate aspects of self concept, as well 
as taking into account the opinions and beliefs of others in shaping this self concept (Harter, 
2006; Lee & Hobson, 1998). Positive self concept, in turn, has been linked to improved social 
and emotional skills, mental health, adaptation, and coping skills (Damon & Hart, 1982; 
Davis-Kean & Sandler, 2011; Harter, 1998). Therefore, in this thesis, three questions will be 
examined in children between six and seven years of age: (1) Do children have a coherent 
sense of themselves as moral actors (i.e., moral self concept), such that they reliably identify 
their own responses to morally relevant situation over time?; (2) How is children’s moral self 
concept related to their social conduct both concurrently and longitudinally? (3) Are there 
other child factors (i.e., temperament, social cognitive understanding and verbal ability) 
which influence or underpin such relations? 
The idea of a moral self concept is one that goes beyond conventional notions of 
moral understanding. When children are asked about their understanding of moral constructs 
(as they are in tasks that tap moral cognition), they are presented with opportunities to show 
their knowledge of moral rules or conventions, and show that they understand the 
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implications of such knowledge in determining actions and feelings (Nunner-Winkler, 2007; 
Rest, 1983). Moral self concept, however, is closely aligned with ideas of conscience, and 
measures of moral self concept ask children to reflect on or convey the thoughts and feelings 
they have about themselves as a moral actor. Thus, moral self concept research seeks to 
determine whether children see themselves as someone who behaves in ways that are good or 
bad, is sensitive to the needs of others or uncaring in the face of their distress, will steal 
desired items from others, or will experience guilt as a result of rule breaking (Narvaez & 
Lapsley, 2009). Defined as such, moral self concept serves as a motivator to moral action 
(Blasi, 1980; Emde, Biringen, Clyman, & Oppenheim, 1991; Malti, Gummerum, & 
Buchmann, 2007), and is inherently concerned with the others’ wellbeing.  
Within Kohlberg’s conceptualisation of children’s moral thinking (Kohlberg & Hersh, 
1977), he identified two important features of moral agency: the developing ability to make 
deontic judgements which reflect the understanding that an act is right or wrong; and the 
subsequent tendency to make responsibility judgements which reflect the motivation to act in 
accordance with initial deontic judgement (Krebs & Denton, 2005; Nunner-Winkler, 2007). 
The ways in which these judgements are made is dependent upon the developmental stage 
achieved by the child, and as children’s development progresses these judgements become 
more sophisticated. For Kohlberg, like Piaget (1997/1932), the motivation to act in moral 
ways is a direct product of moral thought and understanding; as moral understanding 
develops, so does moral action.  
This model of conscience development is primarily a cognitive one based on a child’s 
developing understanding of rules, and the consequences of rule adherence or violation for 
emotions (i.e., feelings of pride or guilt). However, children’s understanding of moral 
constructs per se has not been shown to correspond very strongly with their socio-emotional 
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behavioural dispositions. Rather, children reveal more about their behavioural dispositions  
(e.g., prosocial and antisocial behaviour) when they are asked to make a personal 
identification with the unfolding events (De Rosnay & Fink, 2011; Krettenauer, Campbell, & 
Hertz, 2013; Malti & Krettenauer, 2013). Thus, the motivation to behave morally appears to 
require something over and above understanding; an emotional commitment or sense of 
obligation that is best tapped when children are asked about themselves, rather than a story 
protagonist (Keller, Lourenço, Malti, & Saalbach, 2003). 
Children who demonstrate a view of themselves as moral agents with moral concerns 
have been shown to act in more moral ways while those with a limited moral focus display 
problems with adaptive social functioning (Colby, 2002; Malti, Gasser, & Buchmann, 2009; 
Malti, Gasser, & Gutzwiller-Helfenfinger, 2010). Such findings support the long-standing 
assumption moral identity has a sustained and important influence on conduct, including 
moral choices, decisions, and experienced emotions. This is consistent with self concept 
theory, in which it has been argued that as children gain the ability to see the gap between 
ideal-self and actual-self, they use the ideal–actual differential to motivate action (Harter, 
2006). As such, it has been proposed that moral understanding leads to moral action more 
readily when such actions are connected with personal responsibilities (Blasi, 1980, 1993). 
Against this position of a unidirectional relation between moral identity and action, 
there is some recognition that children's moral development is influenced by their socialising 
environment and interactions (Dunn, 2006; Grusec, 2006). Specifically, it is argued that 
certain socialising experiences (particularly within the family context) are more likely to 
cultivate strong moral sensibilities (Groenendyk & Volling, 2007; Kochanska, Aksan, & 
Nichols, 2003; Kochanska, 1995, 2003; Reese, Bird, & Tripp, 2007). In fact, this is 
suggested, albeit under a different guise, within the work of Piaget (Turiel & Killen, 2010), 
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who ultimately reasoned that social interaction, and the conflicts encountered therein, pull the 
child away from a morality dominated by adult proscriptions and prescriptions, and lead 
him/her to the development of a personal moral understanding, wherein the child comes to 
realise that moral action often involves a compromise between two parties with different 
interests.  
When children start school they are confronted by multiple novel sources of social 
engagement in the form of both teachers and peers. These new sources provide evaluations of 
their behaviours, informing them about their behaviour and contributing to their emerging 
moral identity (Grusec, 2006). This shift in social environment is complemented with 
increasing awareness of others’ psychological states, so-called theory of mind development, 
which enriches children’s awareness of others’ points of view. Indeed, Kohlberg raises this 
himself, noting that “schooling is a moral enterprise” (Kohlberg & Hersh, 1977, p. 53), 
implying that school related socialisation plays an important role in the development of 
conscience. By studying the interrelations between behaviour and identity during these first 
years of school, it is hoped that we can better understand the ways in which a child’s 
changing social environment provides the experience from which they build a sense of self, 
and perhaps also how this sense of self feeds back into their social conduct.  
The remaining sections of this chapter present a more detailed exploration of moral 
self concept, and examine other child features that may be of relevance to moral self concept 
development. First, I describe the nature of moral self concept in childhood and examine 
possible relationships with moral behaviour. In doing so, I make connections with broader 
theories of children’s developing self concept. Second, I explore how child factors, such as 
temperament and social cognition, may be related to both the development of conscience and 
social conduct. Finally, I describe the rationale for the current research program.  
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Moral Self Concept and Moral Behaviour 
Both self concept and moral self concept develop as a product of cognitive (Harter, 
1986; Houck, 1999) and social forces (Kochanska, Aksan, & Joy, 2007; Kochanska, Koenig, 
Barry, Kim, & Yoon, 2010; Lee & Hobson, 1998). While Harter (2006) argues that the self is 
largely a cognitive construction and as such its development throughout childhood mirrors 
cognitive development, the trajectory of identity formation is also deeply integrated with 
social engagement (Houck, 1999) and the child’s observations of their own abilities and 
proclivities (Lindner-Müller, John, & Arnold, 2012). The development of self concept results 
in an understanding of self that is inherently defined by individual differences and it has been 
suggested that a stable self concept develops from continuities in significant social and 
personal experiences (Verschueren, Marcoen, & Schoefs, 1996).  
Motivation to act in any situation presumes a belief in one’s ability to have influence 
in that situation (Bandura, Caprara, Barbaranelli, Pastorelli, & Regalia, 2001; Eccles, 
Wigfield, Harold, & Blumenfeld, 1993), and this is applicable not only to commonplace 
actions and routines, but also to moral actions. In order to initiate moral action, children need 
to believe they are capable of assisting others, preventing harm, or simply refraining from 
transgression. Further, children’s understanding of themselves as good or bad, just or mean, 
is different from their understanding of the rules and conventions that define good or bad 
behaviour, or fairness (Hardy & Carlo, 2005); there must be a desire to adhere to some kind 
of values. 
Moral behaviour has been explained within the literature as behaviour motivated by a 
desire to do what is right, as opposed to avoiding punishment (Asendorpf & Nunner-Winkler, 
1992). Moral behaviour has often been linked to such issues as fairness and protecting the 
welfare of others (Arsenio & Lemerise, 2001) but is by no means determined by a set of 
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concrete rules. Kochanska and Aksan define moral behaviour as “rule-compatible conduct 
without surveillance” (Kochanska & Aksan, 2004, p. 1590) thereby emphasising that an act is 
not moral if motivated by personal interest, desire for conformity, avoidance of harm, or even 
altruistic concern: such behaviour can only be considered moral if the actor understands the 
moral ought, and that the act is born out of this understanding (Nunner-Winkler, 2007). Put 
differently, both intentionality and the intention to do good is necessary for an action to be 
considered moral (Blasi, 1999). 
An important feature of moral self concept is that is should directly impact moral 
behaviour in some ways. For example, Kochanska, DeVet, Goldman, Murray, and Putnam 
(1994) showed that children who felt affective discomfort after rule transgression (according 
to maternal report) were more likely to spontaneously display pro-social behaviours, such as 
confession. In a related study, Cimbora and McIntosh (2003) found specific links between 
guilt, the development of moral self concept, and pro-social behaviours. In contrast to the 
association between increased moral self concept and pro-sociality, it has been suggested that 
limited experience of moral emotions is linked to antisocial developmental trajectories 
(Aksan & Kochanska, 2005), and deficits in moral self concept in childhood may mark the 
origins of a trajectory towards antisocial personality and conduct problems in adolescence 
and adulthood (Frick et al., 2003). Blasi (1999) notes that moral rule understanding alone is 
not sufficient for moral behaviour and that the experience of moral emotions are vital for 
such behaviour to occur. Moral emotions include guilt and discomfort in response to rule 
transgression (Kochanska & Aksan, 2006), shame, contrition, embarrassment (Blair & 
Fowler, 2008), empathy (Groenendyk & Volling, 2007) and pride (Laible & Thompson, 
2000). The precursors of some of these moral emotions appear as early as 18 months of age 
(Kochanska et al., 1994).  
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Children clearly need to have knowledge of moral rules to be able to abide by them 
(Asendorpf & Nunner-Winkler, 1992) but they also need to be motivated to do so. Kochanska 
and Aksan (2006) see anticipated moral emotions (specifically anticipated guilt) as the 
motivational force behind moral behaviour. According to Kochanska and her colleagues 
(Fowles & Kochanska, 2000; Kochanska, 1995, 2003) such motivation, along with 
temperamental characteristics (i.e., inhibition), shapes moral behaviour (see also Asendorpf 
& Nunner-Winkler, 1992). Motivational and temperamental aspects of moral conduct have 
been combined into a larger model by Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau, and Thoma (1999), in which 
moral sensitivity/understanding, judgment/reasoning, motivation, and character interact to 
determine conduct. This model emphasises the multi-dimensional determinants of moral 
conduct, features of which I discuss further below. 
Social Cognitive Understanding 
Social cognitive understanding refers to the understanding of the mental states of 
others (e.g., thoughts, desires, beliefs, intentions, feelings, etc), and the use of such 
knowledge to explain and predict the behaviour of others (Arefi, 2010; Blair & Fowler, 2008; 
Dunn & Hughes, 1998). This ability can also be understood as perspective-taking or theory of 
mind (Ali, Amorim, & Chamorro-Premuzic, 2009; Barr & Higgins-D’Alessandro, 2007). 
Whereas (moral) self concept refers to children’s self-understanding and self-evaluation, 
social cognitive understanding refers to a child’s understanding of the other (Malti & Keller, 
2009).  
In a defining meta-analysis, however, Wellman, Cross, and Watson (2001)compared 
children’s abilities to understand false-beliefs (Wimmer & Perner, 1983), a key feature of 
social cognition, in themselves and in others. They concluded that a child’s understanding of 
others develops significantly throughout the preschool years and is very closely linked to the 
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child’s developing self-understanding, if not reflecting the same core ability. Furthermore, 
Lane, Wellman, Olson, LaBounty, and Kerr (2010) have shown that early social cognition 
(false belief and emotion understanding) predict children’s moral reasoning in the sixth year. 
Social cognitive understanding has also been found to be linked to the development of a 
healthy moral self concept and social engagement (Oliver, Barker, Mandy, Skuse, & 
Maughan, 2011).  
Together, these studies suggest that children’s social cognition may inform self-
understanding in the moral domain, so it is important to establish whether moral self concept, 
as defined above, is in fact an extension of social cognition, or if it captures something 
different about the child. Specifically, in line with Blasi (1983) and Kochanska (2002), moral 
self concept can be construed as a window on moral motivation or conscience, which may 
draw on social cognition but need not be at all equivalent to the capacity to take another’s 
perspective. Therefore, in the study described herein, both moral self concept and social 
cognition are measured so that connections between them can be fully analysed.  
Temperament 
Other sources of individual differences also may impact upon the development of 
moral self concept. A focus on younger children has demonstrated that temperamental factors 
also have an important influence on the interaction between social engagement and moral 
development (Fowles & Kochanska, 2000; Grusec, 2006; Kochanska, Gross, Lin, & Nichols, 
2002; Kochanska, Murray, & Coy, 1997). For example, children with fearful temperaments 
have been shown to develop higher levels of conscience in response to discipline (Grusec & 
Goodnow, 1994; Grusec, 2006; Kochanska et al., 1997).  
Temperament provides the basic building blocks which, when combined with 
environmental factors, allow for a personality to be built. Temperament links individual 
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differences in behaviour to under-lying neural networks, is observable from birth (Rothbart, 
2007) and tends to be showing stability by three years of age (Fowles & Kochanska, 2000). A 
child’s temperament encompasses their emotional, motor and attentional reactivity as well as 
self-regulation (Rothbart, 2007). 
When self-regulation and moral motivation are considered in combination the ability 
to predict behaviour becomes particularly powerful. Children with higher levels of 
impulsivity (lower levels of self-regulation) have been found to make up a higher proportion 
of children referred clinically for behavioural problems (Ablow et al., 1999) and it has been 
found  that the behavioural component of inhibition is a powerful predictor of delinquency 
(White et al., 1994). It has been found that youths with high impulsivity tend to be less caring 
(DeLisi et al., 2011) and in reverse, those scoring highly on measures of psychopathy, a 
possible indicator of lower levels of moral motivation, were found to be more impulsive 
(McHoskey, Worzel, & Szyarto, 1998).  
Impulsivity, and its converse inhibitory control, has both cognitive and behavioural 
aspects (White et al., 1994) and can be seen as a subset of ‘extraversion’ in Rothbart’s (2007) 
three part conceptualisation of temperament. Impulsivity and inhibitory control alongside 
callous unemotional personality traits are seen to be a cornerstone of psychopathy and 
antisocial behaviour in adults and children (Blair, 2007; Dadds et al., 2009; Dadds, Whiting, 
& Hawes, 2006; Frick & Ellis, 1999; White et al., 1994). It has been suggested that this 
underlying disinhibition, when combined with environmental risk factors, is expressed via 
antisocial behaviours and maintains such behaviour across a lifespan (White et al., 1994). A 
possible underlying system to explain impulsivity is a reduced sensitivity to punishment in 
concert with an oversensitivity to reward (White et al., 1994). It has been found that males 
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tend to be more impulsive than females (DeLisi et al., 2011) and that impulsivity is fairly 
stable across a life span (White et al., 1994).  
The links between temperament and behaviour suggest that children’s temperamental 
features, as measured via child self-reports of internal experience, may be linked to the 
development of child reported moral self concept and it is important to understand the ways 
in which this feature of child self concept interacts with the key features of the proposed 
study.  
Developmental trajectory of self concept and moral self concept 
This section will outline the three parallel but deeply interconnected trajectories of 
childhood self development: overall identity, moral self concept and social cognitive 
understanding. What is clear through the research and examination of these three streams is 
their influence upon one another. It can be seen that as children’s social engagement 
broadens, their understanding of themselves and others within the social sphere and as 
independent individuals also expands. As a child’s understanding of themselves as 
individuals with the power to affect the world and those around them grows, so does their 
understanding of the implications of their actions for others and themselves. As will become 
clear, a child’s self concept is intrinsically interwoven with their social experiences and their 
understanding of moral rules and oughts. There are excellent reviews regarding the 
developmental trajectory of self concept across childhood, here some essential aspects are 
highlighted in relation to the development of moral self concept and social cognitive 
understanding. For further detail please refer to Harter (1998, 1999, 2006) and Damon and 
Hart (1982, 1991).  
Kochanska and Aksan (2006) report reliable moral emotions and behaviour by the age 
of two as supported by Emde and colleagues’ finding that children under two modify 
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behaviour in response to moral rules (1991) while Groenendyk and Volling (2007) and Laible 
and Thompson (2000) highlight the period between two and three years of age as critical for 
conscience development. Aksan and Kochanska (2005) locate the development of the 
capacity to regulate conduct and emotion in appropriate ways in the early preschool years and 
Blasi (1999) similarly suggests that children develop the ability to respond appropriately to 
moral emotions, moving from automatic impulses to intentional, meaningful actions and 
experiences at three or four years of age. It has been suggested however that young children 
from around three have consistent, coherent self concepts without the linguistic ability to 
express them (Brown, Mangelsdorf, Agathen, & Ho, 2008). By preschool moral self concept 
and moral motivation is being enacted via self-reported negative feelings after wrong doing, 
apology after transgression, and concern about others’ wrongdoing (Hardy & Carlo, 2011; 
Kochanska, 2002).  
Self concept is continuing to develop through the interaction between emotional 
tendencies, temperament and their social environment; the latter of which is construed 
primarily in terms of the caregiver (Brown et al., 2008) and later the close social environment 
of the school, their peers and teachers (Lindner-Müller et al., 2012; Reis & Youniss, 2004). 
Around this age the links between a child’s social interactions and their creation of identity 
are increasingly evident. For example, the quality of the mother-child relationship at three has 
been linked to general self concept one year later, this effect covering multiple domains of the 
self concept (Verschueren, Doumen, & Buyse, 2012). There is evidence of associations 
longitudinally and concurrently between social competence and moral emotions including 
positive empathy (I feel happy when you appear happy) between the ages of three and five 
(Sallquist, Eisenberg, Spinrad, Eggum, & Gaertner, 2009).  
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The links between social engagement and self concept is also evident in the domain of 
moral self concept although children with behavioural problems at four and five were just as 
able to display concern and pro-social behaviour as children without such behavioural 
concerns, they do appear to experience less positive emotion as a result (Zahn-Waxler, Cole, 
Welsh, & Fox, 1995). It is suggested that these children may be less competent at regulating 
the emotions of others and less able to stay socially engaged in the presence of others’ 
distress. This in turn reducing children’s confidence in their ability to manage these situations 
which further impacts self concept development (Zahn-Waxler et al., 1995).  
Between early and middle childhood a child’s self concept starts to combine 
previously separate concepts creating sets of characteristics (“I am a fast runner” becomes, “I 
am sporty”; Harter, 1998). This process does not result in a reduction of the over-
differentiation of good and bad, a type of all-or-nothing thinking about both the self and 
others however. This shift also occurring within the moral domain, the child developing an 
understanding of others as good or bad via multiple acts (Harter, 1998).  
Children in early childhood who are asked to comment upon the affective outcome of 
not acting pro-socially still respond in ways dependent upon the context, such as the presence 
of a teacher, demonstrating that pro-social behaviour is not yet seen as equivalent in 
importance and consequence as immoral behaviour (Sy, Demeis, & Scheinfield, 2003). 
Concurrently however it has been found that higher levels of moral reasoning at four and five 
is related to children’s pro-social behaviours (Miller, Eisenberg, Fabes, & Shell, 1996) and an 
understanding that apology, a social act, implies remorse for wrongdoing and can have a 
positive effect on the emotions of the victim (Smith, Chen, & Harris, 2010).  
By around five years children recognise that moral and conventional transgressions 
result in different emotional consequences (Prinz, 2005) and they judge immoral behaviour as 
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morally wrong as a result of both aversive negative emotions elicited for the self and the 
other, but also due to a respect for the other and a desire for others to be free from harm 
(Turiel & Killen, 2010). Under the age of seven their moral motivation tends to be based on 
ideas of restraint – on not doing some behaviours rather than acting morally (Stilwell, Calvin, 
Kopta, & Padgett, 1998). 
Brown and colleagues (2008) found that at five, with the right instruments, children 
can provide consistent reports of their own personalities and emotional dispositions that 
match up with reports from their mothers of those same features. In the first years of school 
children start demonstrating a multi-dimensional self concept across areas of academic 
ability, social conduct, internalising symptoms and aggression that can be reliably measured 
using a puppet style interview (see next section for description and analysis; Measelle, 
Ablow, Cowan, & Cowan, 1998; Measelle, John, Ablow, Cowan, & Cowan, 2005).  
By eight children understand that a transgressor’s emotions will be based on the moral 
rule violation rather than achievement of goals – that is, they expect a transgressors to feel 
distress rather than happiness (Nunner-Winkler & Sodian, 1988). At this stage two separate 
aspects of moral self concept are becoming evident: preference for pro-social behaviour and 
avoidance of antisocial behaviour (Krettenauer et al., 2013). At six, children’s moral 
motivation centres on detection and punishment while by eight they are demonstrating the 
effects of internalised concern and justice (Thompson & Hoffman, 1980). 
Children are, in these first years of schooling, showing the ability to reflect and 
comment upon their own social competence (Lindner-Müller et al., 2012) and internal 
psychological experiences (Hart & Damon, 1986). The internalisation of others’ opinions 
about the self, within this broadening social sphere, results in the creation of a more realistic 
sense of self (Leflot, Onghena, & Colpin, 2010).  
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By middle childhood the experience of moral emotions in response to transgression 
including guilt, shame and embarrassment are firmly established (Tangney, Stuewig, & 
Mashek, 2007). By twelve and thirteen rules have become more generalised and abstract, 
they have become values and virtues, these are less concrete and children are less able to 
comply with them with certainty and there is a growing recognition that virtues can work at 
cross purposes, increasing perspective taking skills allows children to see the effects of their 
actions from the other’s point of view (Stilwell et al., 1998). Children are taking into account 
private thoughts and intentions of others alongside actions to judge goodness (Stilwell et al., 
1998).  
Harter (2006) suggests that some individuals by this stage of development 
demonstrate relatively stable self concept but that this stability is not universal, that there 
exists for others a more situation-dependent identity. She puts forward that a stable self 
concept includes global self-worth and esteem, features developed in childhood via 
significant experiences (Verschueren, Marcoen, & Schoefs, 1996). Harter identifies 
instability within self concept as an indicator of individual differences in sensitivity to the 
evaluation of others (see also Cutting & Dunn, 2002), social support and the role of ideal self 
suggesting a role for interpersonal relations within the development and ongoing stability of 
self concept.  
Empathy 
The relationship between empathic responding and conscience varies within the 
literature. These two constructs have previously been conflated (Kochanska et al., 2010) but 
there is also the suggestion that empathy is in fact simply a necessary, but not sufficient, 
precursor of moral self concept (Eisenberg, Eggum, & Edwards, 2010).   
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Empathy can be understood as a vicarious emotional experience in response to the 
perceived internal experience of another (Arefi, 2010; Blair, 1995; Bryant, 1982). Empathy is 
widely considered to be a product of perspective- or role-taking, as outlined above a key 
aspect of social cognition, as is involved in the development of conscience. Empathy has also 
been understood as “an affective response more appropriate to someone else's situation than 
to one's own” (Hoffman, 1987, p. 48) a definition which draws attention to the contrast 
between this, affective empathy, and cognitive empathy or social cognition (Ali & Chamorro-
Premuzic, 2010; Arefi, 2010).  
Some studies have found that moral self concept is best achieved through the 
experience of empathy (Blair & Fowler, 2008; Blair et al., 2001; Eisenberg et al., 2010). 
Empathic distress in children predicts, to a degree, internalized rules (Aksan & Kochanska, 
2005) and pro-social conduct (Barr & Higgins-D’Alessandro, 2007; Eisenberg & Fabes, 
1990) and is important for the control of antisocial behaviour and the development of moral 
reasoning (Blair & Fowler, 2008). Arsenio and Lemerise (2001) reported that adolescents 
diagnosed with conduct disorder, often linked to a poorly developed conscience, were less 
able to recognise the emotions of others and less likely to report that they shared those 
emotions. Both Miller and Eisenberg (1988) and Lovett and Sheffield (2007) found, in their 
meta-analyses of empathy and behaviour, mixed results when considering the relationship 
between empathy and antisocial conduct (Anastassiou-Hadjicharalambous & Warden, 2008). 
Arefi (2010) found a positive correlation between scores on the Bryant Empathy Index 
(Bryant, 1982) and pro-social behaviour as well as negative correlations with measures of 
aggression suggesting that empathy is related to helping behaviours as well as the cessation 
of behaviour that causes distress but the role of empathy within moral self concept is still not 
clear. 
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Measurement of self concept and moral self concept 
One of the key challenges cited time and time again within the literature is the 
development of a measure that meaningfully accesses children’s self concept and internal 
experience (Ablow et al., 1999; Anastassiou-Hadjicharalambous & Warden, 2008; 
Arseneault, Kim-Cohen, Taylor, Caspi, & Moffitt, 2005; Brown et al., 2008; Davis-Kean & 
Sandler, 2011; Measelle et al., 1998). A common solution is the child self-report, these have 
been found to be good predictors of behaviour (Brinthaupt & Erwin, 1992). However, the 
nature of this challenge is multifaceted, any tool must take into account children’s cognitive 
abilities and access to their own internal experience, the effects of social cues, expectations 
and individual differences (Brinthaupt & Erwin, 1992) as well as the ability for the tool to be 
integrated with and, compared to, adult measures of the same construct.  
Measures of self concept have covered individual differences in such areas as self 
confidence, genuineness, goals, personality (Blasi & Glodis, 1995), self efficacy, 
assertiveness, social skills, academic skills (Andreou, 2004), typical behaviour and internal 
states (Eder, 1989). It has been demonstrated (Brown et al., 2008; de Rosnay & Fink, 2011) 
that children between four and six years of age, with the right instruments, can provide 
consistent reports of their own personalities, emotional dispositions and moral experiences 
that match parental reports and behavioural measures. These studies, and others (e.g. Eder, 
1989), suggest that from an early age children are, at the very least, able to recognise, and 
comment upon, consistencies within their internal dispositions and feelings. It is suggested 
that children may in fact be able to give much more accurate descriptions of their own 
internal experiences and than adults as they have unfettered access to such things ((Brown et 
al., 2008; Marsh, Debus, & Bornholt, 2005). 
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Two types of tool have been developed in response to the challenges of accessing self 
concept in children; reactive and spontaneous measures (Brinthaupt & Erwin, 1992). 
Spontaneous measures include open ended, non-prompting questions such as “tell me about 
yourself” whereas reactive measures include researcher-provided items within which the 
participant locates them self. Examples of reactive measures include the Piers-Harris 
Children’s Self concept Scale, the Self Description Questionnaire (Brinthaupt & Erwin, 1992; 
Verschueren et al., 1996) and the Coopersmith Self-Esteem Inventory (Harter, 1982). It has 
been shown that when attempting to access children’s self concept open ended questions 
produce very limited information and tend to focus predominantly on physical traits (Brown 
et al., 2008; Harter, 2006). Brinthaupt and Erwin (1992) report that forced choice measures 
were more likely to access the more evaluative aspects of self concept and open ended 
questions tap into descriptive aspects of self.  
An examination of whether children and adults report consistently upon the same 
constructs is primary, to build an understanding of whether a child’s experience of these 
constructs differs from the ways in which key adults interpret and understand these constructs 
via their behaviour. This also raises the problem that the subjective experience, of for 
example empathy, may be very different from the observed related behaviours. The way in 
which child-report measures are spoken about within the literature implies that these 
measures tap into the same construct as parent- and teacher-reports (Damon & Hart, 1982). It 
has been found however that the correspondence between reports from different respondents 
has varied (Renk & Phares, 2004; Roberts & Strayer, 1996).  
Moral self concept has been measured in a number of different ways. For example, 
the mishap paradigms in which a child is led to believe they have broken something of value 
to the experimenter while gaze, bodily tension and facial affect is measured (Aksan & 
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Kochanska, 2005). Similarly the distress paradigm has been used in which the experimenter 
feigns pain and distress in front of the child and again, gaze, bodily tension and displayed 
affect are measured (Kochanska, Forman, & Coy, 1999; Kochanska et al., 2010; Koenig, 
Cicchetti, & Rogosch, 2004; Zahn-Waxler, Robinson, & Emde, 1992). Other-report 
questionnaires have also been developed to access child conscience such as the guilt sub scale 
of the My Child parent-report measure (Cornell & Frick, 2007; Kochanska et al., 1994) as 
well as child self-reports (De Rosnay & Fink, 2011; Kochanska et al., 2002). The attribution 
of (moral) emotions to story characters after conflict or rule transgression has been used 
widely and it is thought that correct moral emotion attribution is a good indicator of a child’s 
own motivation to behave morally. Rule-compatible conduct and internalized compliance has 
also been measured by examining the internalisation of maternal/experimenter prohibition 
and request directly in the home or in the lab setting (Callender, Olson, Kerr, & Sameroff, 
2010; Kochanska et al., 2002, 2010).  
Another commonly used measure of moral self concept, particularly rule 
internalization, is a task targeting the moral/conventional distinction (Blair, Monson, et al., 
2001). These tasks involve children deciding whether an action is always wrong (a moral 
rule) or only wrong in the presence of a rule defining it as such, (a conventional rule; 
Smetana, 1993). Moral transgressions tend to be defined by their impact on the rights and 
welfare of other people (e.g. hitting others; Blair et al., 2001), that is, the existence of a 
victim. Conventional rules, on the other hand, include socially endorsed patterns of behaviour 
and protocol which do not necessarily prevent direct harm to another person, they guide 
behaviour that, without the rule, would not be considered wrong (e.g. boys wearing dresses; 
Royzman, Leeman, & Baron, 2009).  
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A puppet interview format was originally designed as an interactive interview 
featuring both structured and clinical interviewing techniques (Ablow et al., 1999). The 
Berkley Puppet Interview, a puppet based symptomatology interview was shown to be a 
reliable and valid method of engaging children between four and eight and obtaining their 
perceptions of their own well-being (Arseneault et al., 2005; Measelle et al., 1998) 
independent of their cognitive abilities. It should be noted that these self-report measures do 
not measure abilities but the child’s perception of these abilities and tendencies (Brown et al., 
2008; Harter, 1998).  
In an attempt to address some of the measurement challenges Eder (1990) developed 
a puppet-style interview about self concept and succeeded in showing that three to seven year 
old children are capable of describing their self concept in meaningful and longitudinally 
stable ways using this format (Brown et al., 2008; Kochanska et al., 2010; Kochanska, 2002; 
Verschueren et al., 1996). Puppet-style interviews are structured around forced-choice items 
and encourage the child to identify with one of two puppets who have provided the two 
choices. This structure was designed to address both children’s limited attention and language 
skills and the findings have demonstrated that children show a coherent self concept and can 
communicate this much earlier than previously assumed. Measelle and colleagues (1998) 
have also shown that children’s results on puppet interview scales showed reasonable 
relationships with parent and teacher-reports regarding these constructs. The method has been 
reported to be both reliable and valid (Ablow et al., 1999). Anastassiou-Hadjicharalambous 
and Warden (2008), de Wied et al. (2007) and Arefi (2010) have all found that the items 
within the Bryant Empathy Scale, a child self-report measure of felt empathy, provide a valid 
and reliable measure with meaningful relationships to other measures of empathy.  
29 
 
 
Summary 
Why study moral self concept? One reason is the relationship between moral 
understanding and motivation and behaviour, both positive and negative in children, 
adolescents and adults. There appears to be however a clear link between moral identity and 
moral behaviour both positive and negative (Perugini & Leone, 2009), later socialisation and 
social competence also positively influenced by a well developed moral self concept 
(Kochanska et al., 2010). 
Conduct disorder is one of the most common childhood disorders (Anastassiou-
Hadjicharalambous & Warden, 2008) and has been found to predict criminal behaviour in 
adolescence (Babinski, Hartsough, & Lambert, 1999), antisocial behaviour in adults (Blair, 
2006) and future psychosocial problems (Hofvander, Ossowski, Lundström, & Anckarsäter, 
2009). Children diagnosed with conduct disorder are characterized by persistent antisocial 
conduct, aggression towards people/animals or the destruction/violation of property 
(American Association Psychiatric, 1994) – that is, moral rule violations (Anastassiou-
Hadjicharalambous & Warden, 2008). 
To better provide school environments for children in which they can develop a 
healthy moral self concept we must first understand the forces which influence its 
development. As we have seen there is a strong suggestion that moral self concept, in 
younger children, is being shaped and influenced by their social engagement, much of this 
occurring within the school environment. Not only this, but there are other child features 
which may be influencing this developmental trajectory (e.g. social cognitive understanding 
and temperament). This literature review has provided the impetus to design a study to 
examine in more depth these relationships as will be outlined within the next chapter.  
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Chapter 2: 
Socialisation is the process by which a child, who is acting in the environment, 
gathers beliefs and attributions from socialising agents (e.g., parents, siblings, teachers, 
peers), which can be appropriated and incorporated into the child’s identity. Internalisation 
processes, however they may occur, and resulting behaviours, stem from the relationships 
children have with others (Kochanska et al., 1999) and have been argued to be vital for the 
development of moral self concept or conscience (Grusec, 2006). While the adult literature 
on moral identity strongly suggests that an individual’s moral self concept acts as the source 
of motivation for moral action (Blasi, 1983), there are grounds to suppose that during 
childhood, as children enter school, moral self concept is still in an important stage of 
development and may be very open to external influences from the social environment and 
the child’s changing capacity to understand the world (Grusec, 2006).  
This study aims to explore how children’s social experience, as rated and assessed by 
teachers, is related to their burgeoning moral self concept. In keeping with the conventional 
view that moral identity informs moral motivation and action, it was predicted that moral self 
concept would be concurrently related to children’s social competence, such that a strong 
sense of moral obligation and experience of moral sentiments would be positively associated 
with positive social conduct, and poor moral self concept would be related to behaviour 
problems and impulsivity. Longitudinally, conventional views suggest that early moral self 
concept should predict social competence, but the reverse relationship was also of interest: 
that is, would children’s social track record influence their moral self concept formation 
between six and seven years of age?  
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The logic behind this latter prediction was simple. Given that socialisation factors 
have been shown to influence children’s growing moral orientation in domains of 
compliance, guilt, and conscience (Grusec, 2006; Kochanska, 1991), teacher evaluations of 
children in the school environment should provide a window on behaviours, and reactions to 
such behaviour, that is relevant for children’s view of themselves as morally acting social 
participants. For example, children constantly in trouble for impulsive behaviour should, 
under this view, perceive the evaluations of themselves as poorly behaved and, perhaps, bad. 
By contrast, children praised for good behaviour and recognised as helpful/reliable 
community members should, all things being equal, derive an image of themselves as good or 
responsible.  
Harter (2006) has highlighted the changes in child moral self concept around this age, 
suggesting that these changes are caused by both ongoing cognitive development and social 
interaction. In keeping with this dual focus, I also aim to examine the proposed interactions 
of social cognition and moral self concept on behaviour, with the aim of finding evidence 
supporting the view that moral self concept is more than sophisticated social cognition.  
To do this, it is first essential to establish whether self concept and moral self concept 
domains can be reliably measured and differentiated in a typical sample of children using a 
puppet interview tool. It is predicted that, despite an expected increase in self-reported moral 
sentiments with age, children, by seven years, will have a stable and measurable moral self 
concept. It is also expected that children’s self-reported negative affect, agreeableness and 
timidity, features of self concept, will also be stable.  
To further anchor our understanding of moral self concept, a within-network method 
will be used to examine the relationships between moral self concept and other domains of 
self concept (Marsh et al., 2005). Although this is an exploratory aspect of the study, some 
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specific predictions can be made. First, it is suggested that a relationship between timidity 
and moral self concept will be evident (Kochanska, 1991) as indicated by the suggestion that 
timidity is an expression of executive control, a child’s ability to control their own behaviour.  
It is also hypothesised that, by seven years of age, moral self concept will show a 
reasonable degree of stability via a clear, but not complete, longitudinal relationship with 
moral self concept at six encompassing its ongoing development. 
Further, the nature of moral self concept will be examined and the role of empathic 
sadness will be explored. Specifically, it will be tested whether empathic sadness and moral 
self concept should be combined into a unified construct or kept as separate yet related 
features of personal identity. It is hypothesised that these two sets of items will emerge as 
related but not identical as it is understood that moral self concept is shaped by underlying 
propensity for empathic responding  
Finally, it is hypothesised that social cognitive understanding will play an important 
role in children’s identity formation. Specifically, it is predicted that social cognition will 
have some influence on the formation of moral self concept, such that children with more 
advanced social cognition will be more likely to have a developed moral self concept. By 
contrast, there is little basis to predict that moral self concept will affect the social cognitive 
understanding and, therefore, an asymmetrical relationship is predicted between them.  
To summarise the primary goals of the study a diagram is useful (see Figure 1). First, 
to examine the concurrent relationships between moral self concept and social behaviour at 
each time point as well as the longitudinal stability of these constructs. Second, to 
differentiate between the classical view that moral self concept influences moral action and 
the hypothesised view in which social engagement is still playing a major role in influencing 
the development of moral self concept.  
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Figure 1: Relationships to be examined in study 1 
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Method 
Participants 
Data were collected from children at two time points, once at six years of age (year 1) 
and again when the children were seven years old (year 2). Previously, at five years of age, a 
total of 115 children (59 boys) were recruited from three schools in Sydney which serviced 
lower-middle to middle class families. The current study, however, only concerns those 
children retained in the study at six (n = 106) and seven (n = 96) years. Not all children could 
attend each assessment session, and some children moved schools prior to six and seven 
years of age, which is normal in inner-city schools. There were no exclusion criteria and no 
child was reported to experience severe economic disadvantage. Children came from a 
mixture of ethnic backgrounds and all had English as a native language. In year 1, mean age 
was 79.87 months (SD = 4.79 months; Range = 70 – 90 months), and, in year 2, mean age 
was 92.72 (SD = 4.63 months; 80 – 102 months). Children were recruited via whole class 
invitation, this resulted in uptake rates of between 55% and 82% per classroom (M = 68%).  
Procedure 
At each age, children were individually interviewed on two occasions of 
approximately 30-45 minutes. Interviews took place in a small room adjacent to the 
classroom or a spare space during class time. The order of procedure administration was 
randomised across children. In addition to the measures described below, children were given 
assessments of emotional self-regulation and social understanding. These additional materials 
are outside the scope of this study and are not discussed further.  
Teacher questionnaires were all completed by teachers at the end of the school year so 
that each teacher had spent an entire school year with the child to be rated. For each child 
different teachers completed the questionnaires at six and seven years.  
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Materials 
Self concept. Based on Eder’s (1990) measure of self-concept (CSVQ; appropriate for 
administration to young children), Brown, Mangelsdorf, Agathen, County and Ho (2008) 
describe three conceptually and empirically independent dimensions of self-concept: timidity, 
agreeableness and negative affect. Timidity, describes children who are risk averse and avoid 
harm. Agreeableness refers to a combination of sociability, extraversion, and conscientious 
behaviour. Negative affect describes children who are neurotic, stress reactive, and worry-
prone. Using factor analytic methods, these three constructs were found to be orthogonal and 
independent (Brown et al., 2008). 
On the self concept scale derived by Brown et al. (2008) there were eight timidity 
response items, 14 agreeableness response items, and nine negative affect response items. As 
there was no a priori reason to retain all these items (which were taken directly from Eder’s 
CSVQ), the 8 timidity items were retained and the 8 items loading most strongly on each of 
the agreeableness and the negative affect dimensions were also retained; resulting in a 24 
item scale. Some of these items were subtly changed for Australian children (e.g., ‘jungle 
gym’ was changed to ‘monkey bars’), and the agreeableness item referring to ‘show and tell’ 
was omitted because it was not culturally appropriate. The 24 selected items were presented 
as bi-polar statements delivered by a pair of video recorded hand puppets (described in detail 
below, see moral self concept). Items were randomized and presented in a fixed order, and 
each puppet made equal number of statements strongly endorsing the dimension or 
repudiating it. The items are presented below with the original factor loadings described by 
Brown et al. Children received a total score for each domain between 0 and 7.  
Timidity: I don’t climb up on things that are high (.65); It’s not fun to scare people 
(.70); I don’t think that it would be fun to hang upside-down on the monkey bars (.48); I 
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don’t like to tease people (.50); When I hear lightning and thunder, I would never run to look 
out the window (.55); I don’t like to watch other people fight (.65); When I see something 
scary on TV, I cover my face (.50); It’s not fun riding in a fast car (.51). 
Agreeableness: I like to do what my friends tell me to do (.46); I care about doing a 
really good job on everything I do (.54); When new people come to my house, I show them 
my toys (.69); I like to have people look at me (.81); People want to be around me (.49); I 
share toys with kids I don’t know (.60); I’m a good kid (.48); I would play with a new kid in 
my school (.90). 
Negative Affect: I get scared a lot (.68); I get mad a lot (.90); Some days everything 
makes me grumpy (.63); People always say mean things to me (.55); A lot of things make me 
upset (.63); I like to boss people around (.63); I get sad a lot (.71) I cry when I get upset (.60). 
Moral self concept and empathic sadness. Based on maternal reports of children’s 
morally relevant behaviour, Kochanska and colleagues (Kochanska et al., 1994, 2010) also 
adapted Eder’s CSVQ puppet interview to examine children’s moral self-concept. Their 
interview was structured around theoretical subcomponents of conscience derived from 
maternal reports, which yielded two broad dimensions: Affective Discomfort, including 
indications of child guilt, proclivity to apologize, concern about good feelings with parents 
and empathy; and Active Moral Regulation/Vigilance, including a tendency to confess 
following wrongdoing, attempt at reparation, internalized conduct, and concern about others 
wrongdoing.  
The original moral self concept child self-report (puppet) scale (see Kochanska, 2002) 
consisted of 37 items covering nine domains identified by Kochanska et al. (1994); including 
six items for guilt and four items for empathy. The moral self concept scale has not been 
analysed by sub-domain, instead being treated as a wide-ranging assessment of children’s 
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thoughts and feelings about their own responses to morally relevant situations. Measured as 
such, Kochanska and colleagues have reported acceptable reliabilities for a 37-item version 
of the scale (α = .75; Kochanska, 2002) and 31-item version (α = .65; Kochanska et al., 
2010). Personal correspondence with the scale’s author indicated that there is no ideal 
number of items, and that shorter versions are acceptable. Therefore, a 23 item version was 
developed that covered seven of the original nine domains (see de Rosnay & Fink, 2011): 
apology and sensitivity to violations of standards were omitted. However, unlike 
Kochanska’s original scale, empathy was assessed using items directly from the affective 
sadness dimension of the Bryant Empathy Index (Bryant, 1982; de Wied et al., 2007). This 
approach was taken because the Bryant scale is widely used and validated, and has very 
similar items to those used by Kochanska et al. (2002). Furthermore, empathy was initially 
analysed separately because of important theoretical distinctions between empathy, which is 
construed as an affective resonance with someone else’s predicament, and the other moral 
domains specified by Kochanska, which concern duties and obligations for one’s own 
conduct, and, particularly for guilt, emotional evaluations of one’s own actions. The domains 
and specific items are presented below. 
 Confession (2 items): I tell someone if I break something (versus I hide it if I break 
something); When I do something wrong, I tell someone (versus When I do something 
wrong, I keep it a secret.) 
 Reparation (2 items): If I spill something on the floor, I clean it up (versus If I spill 
something on the floor, I don’t clean it up); If I broke a friend’s toy, I would give them one of 
mine (versus If I broke a friend’s toy, I wouldn’t give them one of mine). 
 Internalized conduct (2 items): If my parents tell me not to do something, I won’t do 
it (versus If my parents tell me not to do something, I still sometimes do it); I usually follow 
38 
 
 
the rules even if my mum can’t see me (versus I sometimes break the rules when my mum 
can’t see me). 
 Concern about others’ wrongdoing (2 items): It upsets me when other people do 
something wrong (versus I don’t mind when other people do something wrong); I try to stop 
other kids from getting in trouble (versus I don’t care if other kids get in trouble). 
 Guilt and affective discomfort after transgressions (6 items): I usually feel bad when I 
break something or spill something (versus I don’t feel bad when I break something or spill 
something); When I do something bad, I worry about it for a long time (versus When I do 
something bad, I don’t really worry that much); It upsets me when someone tells me I make a 
mistake (versus It doesn’t really bother me when someone tells me I make a mistake); When I 
remember a time I got in trouble for doing something wrong, I feel bad all over again (versus 
When I remember a time I got in trouble for doing something wrong, I don’t feel bad 
anymore); When I do something bad, I get really upset (versus I don’t care when I do 
something bad); When I do something wrong, sometimes I get a funny feeling in my tummy 
(versus When I do something wrong, I don’t get a funny feeling in my tummy. 
Concern about good feelings with parents (2 items): If my mum is mad at me because 
I did something wrong, I hate it (versus If my mum is mad at me because I did something 
wrong, I don’t really care); When I do something bad and my mum is upset, I really want us 
to make up (versus When I do something bad and my mum is upset, I don’t mind). 
 Empathic Sadness (7 items): It makes me sad to see a boy who can’t find anyone to 
play with (versus It doesn’t make me sad to see a boy who can’t find anyone to play with); I 
get upset when I see a boy being hurt (versus I don’t get upset when I see a boy being hurt); 
When I see a boy who is crying, it makes me feel like crying (versus When I see a boy who is 
crying, it doesn’t make me feel like crying);  When I see a girl who is crying, it makes me feel 
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like crying (versus When I see a girl who is crying, it doesn’t make me feel like crying); It 
makes me sad to see a girl who can’t find anyone to play with (versus It doesn’t make me sad 
to see a girl who can’t find anyone to play with); Some songs make me so sad I feel like 
crying (versus I don’t ever feel like crying when I hear a song); I get upset when I see a girl 
being hurt (versus I don’t get upset when I see a girl being hurt). 
As for the self concept interviews (see above), children were presented with a pre-
recorded puppet interview in which each puppet declared one of the bi-polar statements listed 
above. Items were randomized and presented in a fixed order, and each puppet made equal 
number of strongly moral statements and non-moral statements.  
For puppet interviews (self concept and moral self concept), there was a brief 
introduction section in which the two gender neutral puppets, Sam and Alex, introduced 
themselves and the task to the child with neutral items (e.g., Sam: I like pizza – Alex: I don’t 
like pizza), and then presented the items. For half the statements Sam spoke first. The first-
speaking puppet occurred in a random order, with the exception that neither puppet could 
start more than twice in a row (to reduce bias towards one puppet). 
Puppet interviews were presented on a laptop, and children were instructed to indicate 
which puppet they identified with most. During the video, the experimenter noted down 
which puppet the child chose for each item. Children were encouraged to point at a puppet of 
choice; however any indication of preference was accepted. If the child hesitated, this was 
noted and they were encouraged to indicate which puppet they were most like. Hesitation was 
in fact very rare and therefore scores were calculated by assigning a point for each item: 
higher scores indicating higher levels of self-reported moral self concept, empathic sadness, 
timidity, negative affect or agreeableness. Moral self-concept (0 – 14) and empathy (0 – 7) 
total scores were created separately.  
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Social skills at six and seven years (SSRS). To assess children’s social skills at both 
time points, teachers completed the Social Skills Rating System Questionnaire (SSRS; 
Gresham & Elliott, 1990). The social skills sub scale of the SSRS is 30-items measuring the 
frequency of various socially skilled and adaptive behaviours within the classroom 
environment (0 = never, 1 = sometimes, 2 = very often) with a focus on pro-sociality 
(Cassidy, Werner, Rourke, Zubernis, & Balaraman, 2003). Items include ‘makes friends 
easily’, ‘helps you without being asked’ and ‘invites others to join in activities’. High scores 
on the total social skills indicated children were more socially skilled (Whiteside, McCarthy, 
& Miller, 2007). The SSRS has been shown to be both reliable and a valid measure of social 
skills (Cassidy et al., 2003) and has been shown to be related to peer problems and social 
skills (Whiteside et al., 2007). 
Social maturity with peers at six and seven years (SMat). Teachers completed the 
Social Maturity Rating Scale at both time points (SMat; Peterson, Slaughter, & Paynter, 
2007); a seven-item scale tapping a child’s social maturity relative to other children of the 
same age. Each item is rated on a seven-point likert scale (1 = very much less mature than the 
average child of this age to 7 = very much more mature than the average child of this age). 
Peterson and colleagues (2007) found that ratings were effectively reflecting individual 
differences in social maturity in children independent of age or verbal abilities. A total social 
maturity score was calculated and showed good reliability (α = 0.96) comparable to Peterson 
et al.'s (2007) findings (α = 0.96).  
Problem behaviours at six years (SSRS-problem behaviours). Teachers also 
completed the problem behaviours sub scale of the SSRS, consisting of 18 items assessing 
the frequency of externalising, internalising and hyperactivity behaviours (see above 
regarding reliability of the SSRS tool). 
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Conduct problems at seven years (SDQ). To further assess social behaviours, 
teachers completed the Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire (SDQ; Goodman, 1997). 
This is a behavioural screening questionnaire for children and comprises five sub scales: 
emotional problems, conduct problems; hyperactivity/inattention, peer relationship problems 
and prosocial behaviour. Each of the scales includes five items, rated on a three point likert 
scale (0 = not true, 1 = somewhat true and 2 = certainly true). The SDQ has been shown to be 
a reliable measure of children’s social behaviour (Goodman, 2001) and is comparable to 
other comprehensive child behavioural screening questionnaires, such as the Child Behaviour 
Checklist (Goodman & Scott, 1999). Only the conduct problems scale (e.g. often fights with 
other children) was used within the current study as an age appropriate tool comparable to the 
SSRS problem behaviours scale.  
Impulsivity at six and seven years (TRIS). At both time points teachers completed the 
Teacher-Rated Impulsivity Scale (TRIS; Gomes & Livesey, 2008; White et al., 1994). The 
TRIS assesses children’s impulsive behaviours in the classroom. The scale includes six items 
all rated on a three point scale (0 = rarely, 1 = sometimes, 2 = always) these include four 
items from the Child Behaviour Checklist (CBCL; Achenbach & Edelbrock, 1983) and two 
items from the Self-Report Delinquency questionnaires (Elliott et al., 1985 as cited by Gomes 
& Livesey, 2008). Items assess such behaviours as impatience, acting without thinking and 
waiting one’s turn. Internal consistency for the six items was high (α = 0.92). A total 
impulsivity score was created by summing all items so that a higher score indicates greater 
impulsivity.  
Social Cognitive Understanding. At both time points, four advanced belief-based 
emotion items were administered, assessing children’s understanding of emotions resulting 
from false beliefs (Harris, Johnson, Hutton, Andrews, & Cooke, 1989). Two of these items, 
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the nice and nasty surprise tasks (De Rosnay, Pons, Harris, & Morrell, 2004; Hughes et al., 
2000) require children to assign an appropriate emotion to a protagonist in a story on the 
basis of the character's incorrect belief. To pass the nice surprise task, children were required 
to attribute sadness to the protagonist on basis of his mistaken belief that he will receive a 
disliked snack, when he will actually receive a pleasant snack. The nasty surprise task follows 
this procedure but exchanges the pleasant and disliked snacks. The other two tasks were 
unexpected contents tasks and assessed children’s attribution of happy and sad emotions 
when a protagonist is faced with a false-belief about the contents of an object. Children’s 
scores could range between 0 and 4 for these tasks.  
Verbal Ability. The Test of Early Language Development-3 (TELD; Hresko, Reid, & 
Hammill, 1999) was used with six year olds to assess children’s verbal mental ability while 
the Test of Language Development (TOLD; Newcomer & Hammill, 1988) was used at seven 
due to age recommendations for these two tests. These tests measure both expressive and 
receptive language ability and for both measures sub scales were summed to create a total 
score. Raw, unstandardised scores were used to allow interpretation across the sample 
independent of age. These were used to index children's language development as such 
measures have been shown to have stronger relationships with children's social cognition 
than more specific tests of verbal ability such as vocabulary tests (Milligan, Astington, & 
Dack, 2007).  
Demographic Information. A short demographics questionnaire was included in the 
parent measures booklet to access information regarding socio-economic status, family 
structure and educational background.  
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Results  
The results are presented in four parts. First, child measures are examined, including 
an analysis of the reliability of the self concept and moral self concept puppet interviews, and 
an examination of longitudinal relations between all child measures. Second, teacher ratings 
of children’s social behaviour are examined, and steps are taken to reduce to the data where 
appropriate. Third, bivariate relations are examined between self concept, moral self concept, 
social cognition, and children’s social conduct; both concurrently and longitudinally. Finally, 
hierarchical regression models are used to determine whether child variables at six years of 
age make a unique contribution to children’s moral self concept at seven years of age.  
1. Child measures 
Table 1 shows the reliabilities for social cognition, self concept, moral self concept 
and empathy. The internal consistency of children’s responding in both the moral self concept 
scale (MSC) and the empathic sadness scale (henceforth empathy) was good, and suggests 
that these measures are tapping into fairly unified constructs, which is impressive given the 
breadth of the items. Regarding self concept measures, both timidity and negative affect had 
moderate but, given the dichotomous response format, acceptable reliability at both six and 
seven years of age. The agreeableness subscale showed poor reliability, however, and is not 
analysed further. Assumptions of normality and skewness were analysed (see Appendix C: 
Assumption testing) and, despite some moderate skewness, all measures remained in their 
original form. Indeed, Table 2 shows that for each self report measure children used the full 
distribution of response scores and there was clearly adequate variation to tap individual 
differences. Only social cognition approached ceiling, with seven year old children clearly 
finding the tasks relatively easy. Therefore, some caution is needed in interpreting this 
measure at seven years. Table 2 also shows that, whereas children’s social cognition 
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improved significantly between six and seven years, t(95) = -4.34, p < .001, self-reported 
measures of self concept, empathy and moral self concept remained essentially constant, ts < 
1.7, ps > .10. Verbal ability is presented as a raw score and, giving the change in assessment 
instruments, cannot be compared in terms of growth, which is not, in any case, of relevance 
to this study.  
 
Table 1. Internal Consistency for Self Concept, Moral Self Concept, and Social Cognition 
 Cronbach α  
at 6yrs 
Cronbach α  
at 7yrs 
Social cognition .78 .65 
Self concept   
Timidity .59 .60 
Agreeableness .34 .35 
Negative Affect .51 .53 
Empathy .74 .76 
MSC .71 .74 
Note. MSC = moral self concept 
 
Table 3 shows bivariate correlations between child variables within and between both 
ages. Various features of Table 3 are noteworthy. First, each of the child variables showed 
significant and moderate to robust stability over time (indicated in Table 3 by shading). 
Second, girls reported significantly more negative affect and empathy at both time points, and 
higher moral self concept at seven years. Third, verbal ability was associated with social 
cognition, as is typical in the literature, both concurrently and longitudinally. By contrast, 
child measures of self concept, empathy and moral self concept were virtually unrelated to 
verbal ability. Fourth, there was no evidence, either concurrent or longitudinal, of a relation 
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between social cognition and children’s moral self concept (or self concept or empathy). 
Thus, children’s self understanding appeared to be entirely independent, at these ages, from 
individual differences in their understanding of mind (as measured on the social cognition 
variable). Finally, children’s responses on the empathy and moral self concept scales were 
very similar at both time points. It should be recalled that Kochanska and colleagues 
incorporated empathy into moral self concept and these findings support such an approach. 
However, we maintain them separately to independently evaluate relations with teacher 
ratings of child behaviour.  
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for Child Variables 
 Six years of age  Seven years of age 
 n Range M SD  n Range M SD 
Age (months) 106 70–90 79.9 4.79  96 80–102 92.7 4.63 
Verbal ability 104 53–75 64.1 4.40  96 13–51 34.3 7.60 
Social cognition 106 0–4 2.9 1.40  96 0–4 3.5 1.04 
Self concept          
Timidity 105 0–8 4.3 1.80  96 0–8 4.1 1.77 
Negative Affect 105 0–8 2.0 1.55  96 0–7 1.6 1.47 
Empathy 103 0–7 3.7 2.01  96 0–7 3.5 2.05 
MSC 103 1–16 10.7 3.15  96 0–16 10.8 3.20 
Note. MSC = moral self concept 
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Table 3. Bivariate Correlations between Child Variables (Longitudinal Stability Denoted by Shading) 
 Six years of age  Seven years of age 
 
Verbal 
ability SCU Timidity 
Negative 
Affect Empathy MSC 
 Verbal 
ability SCU Timidity 
Negative 
Affect Empathy MSC 
SEX .03 .12 .16 .25** .25* .19  .08 -.04 .16 .27** .39** .33** 
6yrs Verbal ability  – .40** -.02 -.17 .19 .14  .56** .26* -.10 -.22* -.06 -.02 
6yrs social cognition  – -.07 -.15 .03 -.02  .45** .43** -.07 -.02 .002 .09 
6yrs Timidity    – -.02 .30** .41**  .10 .06 .48** -.03 .18 .37** 
6yrs Negative Affect     – .11 .01  -.16 -.27** -.02 .34** .23* -.01 
6yrs Empathy      – .55**  .01 .003 .17 -.01 .46** .28** 
6yrs MSC       –  .07 -.02 .19 -.21* .33** .50** 
7yrs Verbal ability         – .29** -.10 -.13 -.11 -.15 
7yrs social cognition         – .09 -.10 -.06 .03 
7yrs Timidity           – .04 .25* .34** 
7yrs Negative Affect            – .16 .02 
7yrs Empathy            – .48** 
7yrs MSC              – 
Note. MSC = Moral self-concept. SCU = social cognitive understanding. * p < .05, ** p < .01 
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2. Teacher ratings of child behaviour 
Tables 4 and 5 summarise teacher ratings of children’s social conduct. It should be 
recalled that different teachers rated children’s behaviour at six and seven years of age, so the 
extent of stability documented in Table 5 between time points is, again, impressive. Indeed, 
Table 5 shows that there were high to very high associations between all of the teacher rated 
behaviour domains, which warranted the creation of global scores for Positive Social 
Conduct (PSocC: social skills + social maturity) and Negative Social Conduct (NSocC: 
behaviour/conduct problems + impulsivity) at each age. These scores were created by 
standardising children’s scores for each scale, and summing standardised scores (which were 
then, again, standardised to yield z-scores). The lower section of Table 4 presents these 
standardised combined scores for positive and negative social conduct at each age. It is 
noteworthy that negative social conduct, in particular shows a strong positive skew, which is 
to be expected in a cohort of typically developing children who should not have excessive 
levels of behaviour/conduct problems. Nevertheless, there was sufficient variation in negative 
social conduct to warrant further analyses, and the scores were not transformed. Correlations 
between PSocC and NSocP were, as expected, all significant, ps < .001, and (absolute) 
correlations (|rs|) were between .47 and .75.   
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Table 4. Descriptive Statistics for Teacher Ratings and Combined Social Conduct Scales 
 Six years of age  Seven years of age 
 n Range M SD  n Range M SD 
SSRS-social skills 106 12–60 41.8 12.96  95 13–60 45.0 11.66 
Social maturity 106 7–49 29.1 8.01  94 7–49 30.9 9.37 
TRIS 106 6–18 8.5 3.32  95 6–18 8.5 3.44 
SSRS-problem 
behaviour 106 0–28 9.1 7.73  – – – – 
SDQ-conduct 
problems – – – –  95 0–9 1.4 2.15 
Combined scales           
PSocC (z-score) 106 -2.4–2.1 0 1  94 -3.0–1.8 0 1 
NSocC (z-score) 106 -1.0–2.8 0 1  95 -.7–2.7 0 1 
Note. SSRS = Social Skills Rating System. TRIS = Teacher Rated Impulsivity Scale. SDQ = Strengths and 
Difficulties Questionnaire. PSocC = positive social conduct. NSocC = Negative social conduct.  
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Table 5. Relations Amongst Teacher Ratingsa of Child Behaviour 
 Six years of age Seven years of age 
 SSRS Social Skills 
Social 
Maturity 
Problem 
Behaviours TRIS 
SSRS Social 
Skills 
Social 
Maturity 
Conduct 
Problems TRIS 
6yrs SSRS Social Skills - .69*** -.78*** -.69*** .59*** .37*** -.43*** -.54*** 
6yrs Social Maturity  - -.61*** -.55*** .45*** .52*** -.30** -.37*** 
6yrs SSRS Problem Behaviours   - .84*** -.59*** -.32** .60*** .66*** 
6yrs TRIS    - -.50*** -.28** .57*** .62*** 
7yrs SSRS Social Skills     - .59*** -.70*** -.75*** 
7yrs Social Maturity      - -.34** -.30** 
7yrs SDQ Conduct Problems       - .80*** 
7yrs TRIS        - 
Note. MSC = Moral self-concept. SSRS = Social Skills Rating System. TRIS = Teacher Rated Impulsivity Scale. SDQ = Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire.  
a Different teachers rated child behaviour at six and seven years of age.  
** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
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3. Bivariate relations between child and teacher measures 
Table 6 shows bivariate correlations between child measures and social 
conduct at six and seven years of age. Importantly, Table 6 reveals that, as expected, 
moral self concept was concurrently related to social conduct (both positive and 
negative). However, longitudinally, there was specificity in prediction between these 
domains: earlier behaviour predicting later moral self concept. There was no evidence 
that children’s moral self concept predicted their social conduct. These findings can 
be contrasted with social cognition, which was again concurrently related to (positive) 
social conduct but, longitudinally, showed the reverse pattern: that is, social cognition 
at six years moderately predicted positive social conduct at seven years but the 
reverse relation did not entail. Taken together, in conjunction with the independence 
of social cognition and moral self concept (see Table 3), no further analyses are made 
of the relation between these domains.  
Table 6 also shows that empathy and moral self concept cleave with respect to 
their relation with teacher rated social conduct; only moral self concept was predicted 
by earlier social conduct and, therefore, a distinction is maintained between these 
domains. In subsequent analyses only the moral self concept scales are used.  
Finally, Table 6 showed a concurrent and longitudinal association between 
timidity and social conduct; in particular, negative social conduct. Given the 
theoretical significance of timidity for moral self concept, as discussed in the 
Introduction, timidity is included in subsequent hierarchical models because of its 
relevance for moral development.  
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Table 6. Bivariate Correlations between Child Variables and Combined (Teacher 
Rated) Social Conduct Scales 
 Six years of age  Seven years of age 
 PSocC NSocC  PSocC NSocC 
Sex: 0-male, 1-female .32** -.19*  .19 .04 
6yrs verbal ability  .16 .01  .24* .01 
7yrs verbal ability  .21* -.01  .21* -.07 
6yrs social cognition .26** -.18  .32** -.15 
7yrs social cognition .10 -.02  .23* .07 
6yrs Negative Affect  -.12 .10  -.13 .10 
7yrs Negative Affect  -.17 .23*  -.18 .33** 
6yrs Timidity  .22* -.26**  .03 -.23* 
7yrs Timidity  .09 -.24*  .08 -.23* 
6yrs Empathy  .22* -.14  .11 .05 
7yrs Empathy .19 -.10  .17 -.05 
6yrs MSC  .28** -.29**  .00 -.10 
7yrs MSC  .38** -.37**  .30** -.24* 
Note. MSC = moral self concept. PSocC = positive social conduct. NSocC = Negative social conduct.  
* p < .05, ** p < .01 
 
4. Hierarchical regressions examining the influence of earlier behaviour 
on later moral self concept 
On the basis of the theoretical considerations outlined in the Introduction and 
the pattern of bivariate relations documented above, a series of hierarchical regression 
models were constructed to examine whether behaviour at six years of age (PSocC 
and NSocC) in fact made a unique contribution to the development of children’s 
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moral self concept (models 1 to 3), once the influences of continuity in moral self 
concept and children’s earlier timidity were accounted for (see Table 3). The final two 
models (4 & 5) then asked if this relationship was genuinely longitudinal, or whether 
it merely reflected profound stability in children’s social conduct between six and 
seven years of age.  
The first two models examined, separately, the influence of PSocC and NSocC 
on children’s later moral self concept, whereas the third model included both indices 
of earlier behaviour to determine if one was of particular importance. Thus, at the first 
step, children’s sex, their six year verbal ability and their six year moral self concept 
were entered as predictors of seven year moral self concept. (The first and second 
steps were the same for models 1 through 3.) The overall model was significant at the 
first step, F(3,90) = 14.71, p < .001, R2 = .34, and both sex (β = .26, p < .01) and six 
year moral self concept (β = .47, p < .001) significantly contributed to children’s 
seven year moral self concept. At the second step, with the addition of timidity into 
the model, there was only a marginal improvement in the model (p = .06), and both 
sex and six year moral self concept remained significant predictors of seven year 
moral self concept. The final (third) steps for each of the first three models are 
summarised in Table 7. Table 7 clearly shows that both six year PSocC and NSocC 
made significant independent contributions to children’s seven year moral self 
concept (models 1 & 2 respectively), but that when these behaviour domains were 
entered together neither positive nor negative social conduct independently predicted 
improvement in seven year moral self concept, despite the fact that the third step was 
significant. Figures 2 and 3 show how six year PSocC and NSocC were related to 
moral self concept and confirm their dual, overlapping influence.  
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Table 7. Hierarchical Regression Analyses Predicting Moral Self Concept at Seven 
Years on Child Variables at Six Years 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variable ∆R2 β ∆R2 β ∆R2 β 
Step 3 .06**  .05**  .07**  
Sex  .19*  .23**  .20* 
6yrs verbal ability  -.06  -.02  -.04 
6yrs MSC  .36***  .35***  .35*** 
6yrs timidity  .14  .13  .13 
6yrs PSocC  .27**  –  .19 
6yrs NSocC  –  -.25**  -.11 
Total R2 .43***  .42***  .43***  
 
In the final two models children’s six year verbal ability and their timidity 
were dropped as predictors/control variables. There was no evidence that they were 
contributing to children’s seven year moral self concept and, furthermore, these final 
two models were designed to disentangle the contributions of earlier (six year) and 
later (seven year) behaviour to seven year moral self concept. Thus, at the first step, 
children’s sex and their six year moral self concept were entered as predictors of 
seven year moral self concept. (The first step was the same for models 4 and 5.) The 
overall model was significant at the first step, F(2,88) = 22.09, p < .001, R2 = .34, and 
both sex (β = .29, p < .01) and six year moral self concept (β = .45, p < .001) 
significantly contributed to children’s seven year moral self concept. Table 8 
summarises the second and third steps of models 4 and 5. Results show that, 
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particularly for NSocC, six year behaviour was in fact stronger predictor of seven 
year moral self concept than concurrent measures of social behaviour.  
 
Table 8. Hierarchical Regression Analyses Predicting Moral Self Concept at Seven 
Years on Child Behaviour at Six and Seven Years 
 Model 4 Model 5 
Variable ∆R2 β ∆R2 β 
Step 2 .08**  .07**  
Sex  .22*  .26* 
6yrs MSC  .39***  .38*** 
6yrs PSocC  .30**  – 
6yrs NSocC  –  -.28** 
Step 3 .01  .00  
Sex  .22*  .27** 
6yrs MSC  .41***  .39*** 
6yrs PSocC  .21a  – 
6yrs NSocC  –  -.24* 
7yrs PSocC  .14  – 
7yrs NSocC  –  -.07 
Total R2 .43***  .42***  
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Figure 2. Relationships between Positive Social Conduct and MSC 
 
 
Figure 3. Relationships between Negative Social Conduct and MSC 
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Discussion 
This study aimed to compare the traditional model of the relationships 
between moral self concept and social conduct with the hypothesised socialisation 
model (see Figure 1). The traditional model, founded on research into older children 
and adults, suggests that moral self concept is a major guiding force behind 
behaviour, specifically social behaviours while the alternative model takes into 
account the ongoing influence of social interaction on shaping moral self concept 
within younger children. Evidence was found to support the proposed model 
suggesting that social conduct predicts the developmental trajectory of a child’s moral 
self concept highlighting the ongoing development of this aspect of identity. The steps 
used to reach these conclusions will be discussed below.  
 
Validity and reliability of self-report measures 
One of the major aims of this project was to assess the validity of child self-
report measures for accessing the internal experiences of children at six and seven 
years of age. This would provide support for previous findings that have suggested 
that the ways in which children comment upon their own internal experiences is 
meaningful and useful in ways that other measures are not.  
Both moral self concept and empathic sadness showed good reliability at both 
time points suggesting that these measures were successfully tapping into unified 
structures as has previously been found (de Rosnay & Fink, 2011). The guilt sub 
scale, as well as timidity and negative affect from the self concept scale, all showed 
lower, but still acceptable, levels of reliability which may suggest that the measures 
are not as successfully differentiating between aspects of children’s self-identified 
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characteristics or, that these constructs are, at this age, perhaps less unified 
highlighting their ongoing developmental changes.  
Agreeableness showed poor reliability at both time points and, despite its 
potential usefulness and its use in previous studies, when its corresponding lower 
levels of stability were considered, this sub scale was removed from all further 
analysis. This contrasted with the findings of Brown and colleagues (2008) and de 
Rosnay and Fink (2011) who found acceptable internal validity for all three sub scales 
of the self concept puppet interview. It is suggested that within this sample of slightly 
older children we are seeing a feature of self concept that is undergoing a shift, that 
perhaps further sub scales need to be extracted from this set perhaps separating 
sociability (e.g. “people want to be around me”) from conscientiousness (e.g. “I care 
about doing a really good job on everything I do”). Although this cannot be done 
using the current sample, it is suggested that within future research factor analytic 
techniques are used to explore this feature.  
It was hypothesised that moral self concept would only be demonstrating 
stable relationships within and between measures in the second year of the study 
however it was evident that this stability was already evident in children as young as 
six. This was supported by the demonstration of acceptable levels of longitudinal 
stability for moral self concept and empathic sadness as well as the two self concept 
sub scales, timidity and negative affect. By six and seven years of age children appear 
to be able to consistently comment upon their own internal experience of self: their 
propensities for behaviour, both moral and conventional and their characteristics. It 
also appears that these tendencies and characteristics are reaching some level of 
stability themselves as demonstrated by stability of teacher-reports of child 
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characteristics and behaviours despite these teachers changing from one year to the 
next.  
These findings suggest that we are able to access, to some degree, the internal 
lived experiences of children between six and seven years of age as understood by 
these children. Young children are able to report meaningfully upon the ways in 
which they see their own proclivities, tendencies and behaviours. This also opens the 
door to developing and using a wider range of self-report measures for children using 
the puppet interview technique to access more than self concept.  
 
Anchoring self-report measures using between construct relationships 
The next stage of analysis was born out of a need to validate child-report 
measures by using both other child-report measures and teacher-report measures. The 
use of the moral self concept and self concept scales was supported via their 
relationships with other measures. For example, the lack of relationship between 
verbal skills, as measured directly, and moral self concept suggests that children are 
using this tool to comment upon their own internal states independent of their 
language development. It does not matter how verbally skilled these children are they 
are still able to comment reliably upon their internal lived experience of self. This 
finding responds directly to the oft quoted problem of child self-reports being limited 
by their developing verbal ability, and demonstrates that this, the puppet interview, 
may be a useful and informative tool.  
Relationships at six years of age between timidity and teacher-reported social 
conduct were found suggesting that children who self-reported as more timid were 
seen by teachers to be more socially mature, less impulsive and less likely to exhibit 
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problem behaviours. Brown and colleagues (2008) define timidity as a tendency 
towards harm and risk avoidance as well as greater control. The relationships between 
timidity and social conduct, both positive and negative, suggest that children who 
avoid risky situations may also tend towards greater levels of inhibitory control 
alongside this limited stimulus seeking behaviour. Social maturity in this case may be 
viewed as refraining from acting upon impulse; these are children who can stop long 
enough to understand the appropriate (safe or ‘right’) course of action in a given 
situation before acting upon it. This finding is supported by previous findings linking 
control and child behaviour (e.g. Callender et al., 2010; Kochanska, Barry, Jimenez, 
Hollatz, & Woodard, 2009; Kochanska et al., 1997). This view of timidity as control 
as well as risk-aversion is further supported by the negative relationship found 
between timidity and teacher rated problem behaviours. Children need to be able to 
understand the rules, be motivated to follow them (Bergman, 2002) and have the 
inhibitory control required to follow through with the appropriate behaviour (Reese et 
al., 2007).  
The relationship between timidity and social maturity disappears by the age of 
seven suggesting possible internalisation leading to a reduction in the outward signs 
of inhibitory control. Perhaps, by seven, these children are following social guidelines 
more fluidly than they had the previous year without the external signs of effortful 
control. A suggestion could be made that the Social Maturity Scale specifically is 
tapping into a child’s increasing knowledge of their own role and responsibility 
within the classroom rather than social skills themselves affecting the overall positive 
social conduct score. Child self-reported timidity appears to be a useful and 
informative aspect of child identity and the evidence suggests that children’s own 
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access to this feature of self is meaningful. This suggests that timidity should be 
considered in more depth in further research into behavioural problems and social 
skills. As timidity has been understood here in the context of moral behaviour it 
would be interesting to further understand how the ability to ‘pause’ before acting 
would influence children with lower levels of moral motivation.   
These between-construct relationships further support the use of the self-report 
moral self- and self concept measures but also the examination of moral self concept 
more generally. This child identified characteristic of self does in fact appear to be 
related in meaningful and expected ways to how children at six and seven years of age 
are interacting with their social environments and how this interaction is viewed by 
key figures within this environment.  
 
Nature of the moral self concept scale 
The next stage of analysis involved a closer examination of the construct of 
moral self concept itself. Specifically, the role of empathic sadness and its link to 
overall moral self concept were looked at. The patterns of relationships both within 
the moral self concept construct and between this and behavioural and self concept 
constructs suggested that empathic sadness was best seen as separate, but closely 
linked, to moral self concept. This finding is not perfectly clear however and a more 
detailed analysis of the components of moral self concept is required. The original 
scale, as designed by Kochanska and colleagues (1994), included ten sub scales 
ranging from internalised conduct to concern regarding the transgressions of others. It 
is possible that these sub scales are not performing uniformly and may show different 
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relationships with empathy and other features of the child. This calls for the deeper 
examination of the moral self concept measure. 
Empathic sadness and moral self concept can be seen to represent two separate 
components of the larger notion of conscience. It seems likely that empathic sadness 
is the affective motivation from which moral self concept emerges (Eisenberg et al., 
2010). To further examine this, timidity was again used as an anchoring construct. 
Timidity, as conceptualised as a type of inhibitory control, seems to be feeding back 
into a child’s concept of themselves as moral agents but not predicting their 
experience of empathic sadness, this fits with the idea that empathic experience is the 
pre-existing thrust that sits alongside traits such as timidity, from which moral self 
develops (Eisenberg et al., 1996, 2010). Further support comes from the asymmetrical 
relationships between timidity and the moral measures. Timidity appears to be a better 
predictor of later moral self concept than moral self concept is of timidity suggesting 
that it is an ability to control behaviour, to pause before acting that allows the child to 
work through a process of moral reasoning and analysis of possible outcomes that 
then helps develop their own moral self concept.  
This suggestion was further examined in light of the alternative model of 
moral self concept development. Via the regression models performed it becomes 
clear that although timidity is important, social conduct is more influential in 
predicting children’s moral self concept. It is suggested that the effect of timidity is 
being hidden within these models by social conduct measures that subsume timidity 
and its effects such as impulsivity. This avenue of enquiry motivates to an extent the 
deeper analysis of these constructs and their relationships and an examination of the 
idea that timidity may be more of a global background construct and moral self 
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concept is a product of this, a more state based behavioural construct, it is suggested 
that future research try to incorporate timidity into the model proposed in Figure 1.  
Looking at the experience of empathic sadness more closely, the lack of any 
evident relationship between negative affect and empathic sadness at six years of age 
suggests that empathic sadness is not just a specific example of a more general sense 
of negative affect but a specific emotional experience that children are reporting on. 
That is, sadness felt in response to the sadness of others is not just a specific example 
of a tendency for negative affect or stress reactivity but is linked specifically to 
conscience.  
 
Examining social cognitive understanding 
It was hypothesised that social cognitive understanding, a child’s insight into 
the internal beliefs and emotions of others, would appear as a precursor to moral 
development but that moral self concept would emerge as a meaningfully separate 
construct. It was understood that a child’s ability to comment upon the internal 
experiences of others and their understanding of their own internal experiences should 
relate differently to their behaviour and social engagement. This hypothesis was 
supported and the findings suggest that social cognitive understanding is related to 
concurrent positive social engagement over and above moral self concept at six years 
of age but that by seven this was no longer the case.  
This supports the idea that for children first entering school moral self concept 
has not yet begun playing the important role that it does later. The idea that children’s 
own skilled social engagement is still being predominantly driven by external rules, 
guidelines and social cues as understood by the child and that only later do these 
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children internalise these, a process that informs their understanding of their own 
moral sensitivities. It is suggested that this self awareness of moral agency then 
begins to increasingly drive children’s behaviour.  
The suggestion that social cognitive understanding is important and 
informative, but in a different way to children’s self-reported moral self, is also 
supported by the data. The ways in which children talk about other people’s 
emotional experiences, beliefs and desires seems to be related only to concurrent 
positive social conduct when children are six years old but that by the time they are 
seven, after another year within the school environment, the relationships between 
social conduct and the ways in which children describe their own internal experiences 
becomes much more informative.  
 
Relationship between moral self concept and social conduct  
The main driver of this study was the examination of the relationships 
between social conduct and the developmental trajectory of a child's moral self 
concept. It was hypothesised that, for children between six and seven years of age, the 
effect of social engagement on moral self concept would be evident, in support of the 
alternative socialisation model (see Figure 1). This hypothesis has received significant 
support within this cohort. Children’s self-identified moral experience showed 
systematic relationships with teacher-reports of their social conduct.  
Importantly the longitudinal relationships between moral self concept and 
social conduct were shown to be asymmetrical. Moral self concept at seven years of 
age was predicted by earlier teacher rated social conduct but social conduct at seven 
was not related to moral self concept at six in the same way. It appears that within this 
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age group the interactions and relationships between teachers and students is having a 
bigger effect on the way students see themselves then the effect of the children's self 
concept upon these social behaviours.  
When these relationships were examined more carefully it became clear that 
the predictive power of social conduct for later moral self concept remains strong 
even when controlling for other variables of interest. Not only this but these 
relationships also stand up when controlling for the strong longitudinal stability of the 
constructs. It appears that, independent of a child’s initial moral self concept; their 
social conduct is playing a significant role in refining and developing this aspect of 
identity. Social conduct at seven, also predicts variance in moral self concept 
controlling for this stability.  
It became clear that positive social engagement (social skills, social maturity 
and pro-sociality) and negative social engagement (impulsivity and problem 
behaviours) both equally and independently accounted for variance in later moral self 
concept. The question remained however, which was the driving force behind the 
development of a moral self concept, engaging in positive social conduct and 
receiving positive feedback, or negative social conduct and the resulting negative 
feedback? From the regression models, and the breakdown of social conduct in Figure 
2 and 3, it appears that it is the children displaying lower levels of positive social 
conduct that are reporting a bigger negative effect on moral self concept – the greater 
the deficit of positive social behaviour the lower the eventual moral self concept. For 
children showing average or high levels of positive social conduct, the “good kids”, 
the effect on moral self concept was negligible, this was not mirrored for negative 
social conduct. On all examinations of the effects of positive and negative social 
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conduct positive engagement seemed to be the stronger, more predictive measure and 
construct.  
When we examine these findings within the context of the current literature, it 
seems possible that moral self concept deficits are emerging from a lack of positive 
reinforcement from teachers (Carlo, McGinley, Hayes, Batenhorst, & Wilkinson, 
2007; Grusec & Goodnow, 1994; Owen, Slep, & Heyman, 2012) as well as the 
impact of parents, peers and other social informants. When children’s behaviour is 
considered “good”, appropriate or moral they are praised, when it is viewed as “bad”, 
inappropriate or immoral they are punished or reprimanded. The effects of these two 
outcomes should be expected to be different. The current data provides some support 
for the suggestion that it is the children who are receiving limited positive feedback 
that are suffering and failing to develop a healthy moral self concept rather than the 
children receiving specifically negative feedback. The presumption that moral self 
concept is driven by negative social conduct is a position that fits in with the literature 
on the negative effects of punishment on self concept (Kerr, Lopez, Olson, & 
Sameroff, 2004). It appears that the effect of social conduct upon moral self concept 
is less relevant for children who are average or good at social engagement and it is the 
children who are seen by their teachers as lacking the ability to engage pro-socially 
whose moral self concept suffers.  
Moral self concept at six years may play a small role in predicting later 
positive social conduct, as suggested by the traditional model of moral motivation, but 
this is as yet undetectable here and the trend towards significance within this data 
cannot be taken as meaningful as yet. Negative social conduct displays a lack of 
predictive power when considering later moral self concept when concurrently 
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considering positive social conduct. This reinforces the idea that positive engagement 
seems more powerful in this story than negative engagement.  
The lack of relationships evident between the role of moral self concept at six 
and teacher-rated social and behavioural measures at seven, in conjunction with the 
set of predictive relationships between these same teacher-rated items at six and self 
concept at seven, seems to indicate a directional relationship between the factors. This 
asymmetry may suggest that teachers’ views of children at six impacts upon their 
views of themselves at seven. That is, the ways in which teachers see children – 
whether accurate or not – is fed back to children changing and shaping their own 
understanding of their moral selves, their tendency to experience empathic responses 
to the distress of others. Simplistically, children who are seen as socially ‘not good’ 
by their teachers at age six, see themselves as morally ‘not good’ at age seven. A 
finding reminiscent of those ideas put forward by McKown, Gregory and Weinstein 
(2010) and Rosenthal and Jacobson (1968) in their work on self-fulfilling prophecies 
in classrooms and suggests that the behavioural outcomes may be a result of external 
(teacher) expectations on a child's identity rather than directly upon their behaviour 
and achievement; however, the current data cannot explicitly support this.   
Hardy and Carlo (2011) and Damon and Hart (1982) explore the bidirectional 
nature of the relationship between identity and action, suggesting the importance of 
action in shaping self concept as well as self concept in guiding behaviour. It is this 
action that teachers are reporting on; teachers cannot access the inner world of the 
child and can only make inferences regarding this via their behaviour.  
All the behavioural outcome measures presented here are teacher-rated and 
therefore inherently subjective; however, it is these teachers who respond to 
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children’s behaviours, reprimanding or praising, ignoring or attending to them. This 
feedback and its internalisation, continue to shape the self concepts of these children. 
It should be noted that from six to seven years old these reports are being made by 
different teachers and yet their consistency remains speaking to the reliability and 
validity of the tools. Although what should be noted here is that the child does not 
simply move from one grade to another, from one teacher to the next, but that their 
reputation also moves with them. It is to be expected that in certain cases the lingering 
effect of this teacher-held child-concept may still affect teacher-reports; a child who is 
reported to be naughty by one teacher may be more likely to be seen as naughty by 
their next teacher. As a result teacher report measures should be interpreted with some 
caution and the meaning of the outcomes considered.  
For example, the Social Maturity Rating Scale is a relative scale, children are 
rated in relation to other children their age, that is, the other children in their class, 
meaning that scores may differ in meaning across different classrooms. Teacher 
impressions of children may be skewed by the children in the class – one particularly 
hyperactive child (whether included in the study or not) may reduce the rating for all 
other children in that classroom. These same themes are evident in other non self 
concept measures highlighting the need for multiple informants and wherever 
possible objective behavioural measures.  
This study has explored the area of the development of moral identity but it 
important to continue the search for the factors leading to the judgement-action gap. 
Why do some children, with an appropriately developed moral understanding still fail 
to act in accordance with this understanding? This study has focussed on the external 
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factors influencing the development of moral self concept and it is suggested that 
future research examines further the internal features that may shape this relationship.  
 
Strengths and limitations of the current study 
This study has provided support for the use of child-report measures of self 
concept and demonstrated that this method of accessing the internal experiences of 
young children is not only valid but useful. This opens the door to the development of 
further child-report measures of other child characteristics and features. This study 
has also provided support for the new model of moral self concept development 
which suggests that within the first years of school moral self concept is still being 
significantly shaped by teacher-child engagement and suggests that this is still a 
fertile age in which to intervene and support the healthy development of child 
conscience.  
The longitudinal nature of this study is one of its primary strengths providing 
the ability to see individual differences in moral self concept development and the 
influences of social engagement on this process. It has also examined moral self 
concept development within an age range previously somewhat overlooked.  
Parent-reports alongside teacher-reports could have provided a greater 
window into the social interactions and engagement of children in different contexts. 
This study focussed primarily on the new influences of the school environment but it 
cannot be ignored that the family environment remains a key source of influence and 
that this environment may be similarly fluid for children at this time. The influences 
of parent-child relationships on behavioural outcomes and children’s well-being has 
been studied extensively (Duncombe, Havighurst, Holland, & Frankling, 2012; 
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Feldman, 2007; Kochanska, Aksan, Knaack, & Rhines, 2004; Laible & Thompson, 
2000; Reese et al., 2007) and in the light of the current research it is suggested that 
future projects examine the possible interactions between these influential 
environments.  
Despite our hypotheses it is still unclear whether teacher reports are reflecting 
children’s social behaviour alone and to what extent these measures capture teacher 
attitude. The teacher reports are fairly consistent across years despite two different 
teachers commenting upon these behaviours however as has been discussed, 
children’s “reputations” tend to follow them through school and these may influence 
teacher opinions biasing their responses to the child. Within this thesis the assumption 
has been made that teacher reports do, to an extent, reflect the attitudes of teachers as 
well as simply the behaviours of the children, and that these attitudes will be reflected 
in the ways in which teachers respond to the children (Rosenthal & Jacobson, 1968). 
To examine actual interactions between teachers and children within the classroom 
setting was beyond the scope of a research project such as this but to do so would 
open up our understanding of teacher reports to a greater degree.  
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Chapter 3: Discussion and Conclusions 
 
To revisit the simplicity of the model outlined in Figure 1 it becomes clear that 
this story is far from simple and far from complete. There is a suggestion within the 
data that as children first enter the wider social environment of school, novel social 
interactions play an influential role in shaping the ways in which these children see 
themselves but, that as they get older and their moral self concept stabilises and 
coalesces, these influences may shift. It is possible, although not explicitly tested 
within this study, that perhaps only once a child’s moral self concept has become 
concrete will it have a stable and predictable role in guiding behaviour. The short time 
span of this longitudinal study leaves this supposition unanswered and a sustained 
observation of children through the early school years would be necessary to clarify 
this. This study has clarified a number of key issues about the developmental 
trajectory of a child’s moral self concept, but it has also opened the door for further 
questions to be asked. These questions have inspired the design of a second linked 
research project the features and aims of which will be discussed below.  
 
Stability and Development of Moral Self concept 
Moral self concept has proven to be a useful and interesting component of 
child development showing notable relationships with behaviours, empathic 
experience and social engagement. It was suggested that this feature would only be 
reaching stability within the time frame of this study however it became increasingly 
evident that a certain degree of stability had already been reached despite ongoing 
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clarification and influence by six years of age. It is important to understand at which 
point in a child's development this identity starts to coalesce and have impact 
meaningfully on the child's wellbeing and engagement. Within the proposed research 
project a younger cohort will be included (from five years of age when children start 
kindergarten) to examine this more fully.  
 
Measuring Social Engagement 
In the current study social engagement was split into positive and negative 
conduct ranging from pro-sociality to clinically relevant conduct problems. It has 
been suggested that teacher reports of such conduct must also, to some extent, reflect 
the ways in which teachers respond to these children. It is suggested that children seen 
by teachers to be ‘naughty’ or ‘bad’ will, as a result, be children more often punished 
or chastised within the classroom whereas ‘good children’ will more regularly be 
praised. The literature on the effects of praise and punishment upon the behaviours 
and self concept of children is vast (for example, Cutting & Dunn, 2002; Grusec & 
Goodnow, 1994; Kamins & Dweck, 1999; Leflot et al., 2010; Miller & Eisenberg, 
1988; Owen et al., 2012). If we are to look at these findings within a practical setting 
and ask whether we can take these findings to speak towards how teachers should 
respond to children to facilitate a healthy moral self concept development, these 
issues become harder to clarify. Clinically, there are meaningful differences between 
increasing positive praise and reducing negative engagement with a child’s 
environment. As we have seen within the literature a healthy moral self concept does 
relate to behaviour and child wellbeing, it seems important therefore to encourage 
healthy development of a moral self concept, but how?  
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The findings presented here tentatively suggest that by increasing positive 
reinforcement for children who are doing well socially we can’t expect much change, 
but by positively engaging with children who are seen to be struggling with social 
engagement we may see some shift. It is impossible to say whether these suppositions 
are correct in the light of the current findings but there is a strong suggestion that this 
is an issue that deserves greater examination, as we have seen within the literature, 
children with poorly developed moral self concept are vulnerable to poor social 
engagement, poor behavioural skills and in the extremes, more severe cases of 
conduct disorder.  
 
Internal Child Features and Moral Self concept Development 
It was posited within Chapter one that the relationship between social 
engagement and the development of moral self concept was not a simple one and that 
other factors, such as child characteristics may play an important role in this process. 
A second study has been designed with the aim of examining in more detail the 
possible effects of the child characteristics callous-unemotionality and 
Machiavellianism, on the development of a child’s moral self concept and the ways in 
which socialisation shapes this development. At the time of writing data collection for 
this study in ongoing.  
Where the current study points to moral self concept as being an accrual of 
experiences and an internalisation of social experiences, the new project sets out to 
examine child centred predictors of moral self concept. It will focus on the features of 
the child which may influence the ways in which later social interaction is understood 
and internalised. In the current thesis we saw that a teacher’s evaluations of a child’s 
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behaviour informs their later understanding of self – but what if a child lacks the 
resources necessary to develop a moral self understanding, what if the child lacks the 
necessary empathic ability? It is predicted that some more stable child characteristics 
such as empathy may co-vary with moral self concept and support this apparently 
environmentally driven feature. The goal now is to better understand moral self 
concept in terms of well recognised aspects of children’s emotional and ethical 
development specifically in terms of empathy, callous unemotionality and 
Machiavellianism.  
As outlined by Grusec (2006) and Kochanska (1991), child characteristics, 
including personality traits, play an important role in mediating the relationship 
between socialisation and the development of identity. Cornell and Frick (2007) and 
Kochanska have demonstrated a link between temperament and the experience of 
guilt via poor self control, a feature of child moral development linked to moral self 
concept. Rothbart (2007) also reports that both fearfulness and effortful control also 
predict guilt, empathy and aggression, affective and behavioural correlates of moral 
self concept. Supporting the interaction between conscience and child characteristics 
is the finding that, in preschool, fearful children show a greater development of 
conscience and that socialisation influences this relationship (Kochanska et al., 2007). 
These are features of the self that support the healthy development of a moral self 
concept. Machiavellian and callous unemotional (CU)/psychopathy traits are, on the 
other hand, predicted to hinder this development (Blair, Colledge, Murray, & 
Mitchell, 2001). The link between children’s personality, temperament and 
conscience has previously been examined by the likes of Asendorpf and Nunner-
Winkler (1992), Dadds and Salmon (2003) and Houck (1999), however, research into 
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the specific factors of callous unemotionality, psychopathy and Machiavellianism has, 
so far, been limited.  
The planned study aims to examine how Machiavellianism and 
CU/psychopathy traits are related to moral self concept and empathy and to look at 
the construct of MSC more closely. If moral self concept reflects a genuine 
development in the child as the current study suggests, is likely to overlap with 
empathic concern for others and in the planned study a more embodied measure of 
empathy will be alongside a child report of experienced empathic sadness and a 
teacher-report of expressed empathy. Machiavellian and CU/psychopathic traits are 
two related but different indicators of the same underlying problem, a lack of 
empathic understanding of the other. It is understood that empathy is vital for the 
development of a moral sensibility and an understanding of the self as an affective 
moral agent, as a result, an overlap between moral self concept and both 
Machiavellian and CU traits is expected showing that as these traits increase, 
children’s moral self concept will show a failure to develop. It has been hypothesised 
that some of the children who lack the motivation to behave in moral ways fall into 
these two overlapping but not identical groups (Hawley, 2003; Muñoz, Qualter, & 
Padgett, 2011).  
Machiavellian traits are linked to social engagement and awareness, that is, 
children high in these features tend to show an awareness of the impact on their social 
relationships and power. This understanding leads to a set of hypotheses regarding the 
relationships between not simply Machiavellian traits and moral self concept but with 
the sub scales of this construct such as reparation, guilt and concern with good 
feelings of others. It is expected that those features related to affective aspects of 
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conscience (e.g. guilt) will show a negative relationship with Machiavellian – children 
high in these traits hypothesised to experience little guilt, but those aspects related to 
interpersonal relating such as confession, will show a positive relationship with 
Machiavellian traits. This pattern suggested as an embodiment of their tendency for 
manipulation and skilled social engagement.  
Conversely, children showing CU and psychopathic traits are expected 
express less desire to fulfil these social norms and are predicted to show a much more 
consistent pattern of relationships with the moral self concept sub scales. It has also 
been suggested that children with callous-unemotional traits of psychopathic traits 
may be less sensitive to punishment (Blair, 2006; Dadds & Salmon, 2003) and as a 
result it is hypothesised that teacher-child interactions regarding social engagement 
may have a smaller impact on the ongoing development of the child's conscience as a 
result. It is expected that there will be a general negative relationship between 
children’s views of themselves as moral and teacher’s views of them as displaying 
these traits.  
 
Machiavellian traits 
Machiavellianism is a personality trait generally seen to encompass a 
willingness to manipulate others for personal gain, a cynical view of human nature, a 
belief that others are untrustworthy, a general rejection of conventional moral 
structures and a lack of affect within relationships yet lacking any specific pathology 
(Andreou, 2004; Braginsky, 1970; Christie & Geis, 1970; Loftus & Glenwick, 2001). 
Children with Machiavellian traits were defined by Hawley (2003) as those who use 
coercive techniques to gain resource control by using pro-social and cooperative 
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techniques. Individual differences in Machiavellian traits have been found in children 
as young as ten, however children younger than this have not been widely examined 
(Christie & Geis, 1970). Machiavellianism has been viewed as a unified construct by 
some (e.g. Hunter, Gerbing, & Boster, 1982) and as multidimensional by others (e.g. 
Andreou, 2004; Sutton & Keogh, 2001). 
Hawley (2003) found that due to the combination of social tactics those with 
Machiavellian traits were “liked by peers, socially skilled, and well adjusted” (p. 
279). For children with Machiavellian traits, the balanced approach to resource 
control appears to be a socially effective approach leading to children who do better 
in the eyes of their peers and teachers than those children who engage in pro-social 
behaviours without the coercive techniques. This view of Machiavellianism is 
somewhat softer than that usually found within the personality literature which 
stresses the cynicism and willingness to manipulate others without the 
acknowledgement of the higher levels of social skills (Ali et al., 2009).  
Machiavellian traits have been linked to psychopathy (Loftus & Glenwick, 
2001) and conduct problems in adults and relational aggression and emotionally 
damaging behaviour in children (Geng, Liu, Su, Wang, & Li, 2009; Kerig & 
Stellwagen, 2010; McHoskey et al., 1998; Stellwagen & Kerig, 2013) including 
bullying (Andreou, 2004). Machiavellian traits have been linked in adults to deficits 
in stress management, shallow emotional involvement, limited empathy and poor 
psychosocial functioning. Stellwagen and Kerig (2013) have highlighted the role of 
“the dark triad”, narcissism, psychopathy and Machiavellianism, (Paulhus & 
Williams, 2002; Stellwagen & Kerig, 2013) in the development of antisocial 
behaviour in both children and adults. Lyons, Caldwell and Shultz (2010) found a 
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negative correlation between theory of mind and Machiavellianism and suggesting 
that those with high levels of Machiavellian traits may show social cognition and 
empathy deficits, Stellwagen and Kerig (2013), on the other hand, found no such 
relationship with theory of mind.  
There has been very limited research into Machiavellian traits in children 
under the age of eight, this area explored only by Repacholi and colleagues 
(Repacholi, Slaughter, Pritchard, & Gibbs, 2011). It has been suggested however that 
children much younger than this, anecdotally, show features in line with 
Machiavellianism (Christie & Geis, 1970).  
The Kiddie Mach was developed by Nachamie (1969) and is a measure of 
Machiavellian traits for children that has been used more widely than other child 
oriented tools. Andreou (2004) uncovered four independent but parallel components 
of Machiavellianism as measured by the Kiddie Mach: lack of faith in human nature, 
manipulation, dishonesty and distrust, suggesting that the more multidimensional 
view of Machiavellianism is valid (Andreou, 2004). The Kiddie Mach has been used 
by Arefi (2010), Geng and colleagues (2009), Barlow, Qualter and Stylianou (2010) 
and Sutton and Keogh (2000) to examine Machiavellian traits in children from ten 
years of age. Repacholi and colleagues (Repacholi et al., 2011) developed another 
child oriented tool, the Machiavellian Rating Scale for Young Children which has 
been used extensively by Kerig and Stellwagen (Kerig & Stellwagen, 2010; 
Stellwagen & Kerig, 2013).  
Callous unemotional and psychopathic traits  
Children, and adults, with high levels of callous-unemotional (CU) traits are 
defined as such by their lack of empathy, remorselessness and shallow affect 
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(Enebrink, Andershed, & Långström, 2005). CU traits are broadly defined by a lack 
of guilt (Cornell & Frick, 2007). Cornell and Frick (2007) describe a model in which 
CU traits lead to deficits in social skills with the development of conscience. This 
model is proposed here suggesting directionality from temperament to conscience 
advocating CU traits’ use within the proposed study as a possible source of interaction 
between a child’s social environment and their developing moral self concept.  
This model is supported by the findings that children with CU traits show 
reduced guilt and empathy compared to those without CU traits (Cornell & Frick, 
2007; Frick & Ellis, 1999). It has been found that children with conduct disorder and 
CU traits have increased affective deficits, insensitivity to distress, higher levels of 
thrill seeking and less responsiveness to punishment, features all linked to lower 
levels of behavioural inhibition (Anastassiou-Hadjicharalambous & Warden, 2008).  
Psychopathic traits have been seen as a combination of “guiltlessness, 
callousness, dishonesty, egocentricity, failure to form close emotional bonds, low 
anxiety proneness, superficial charm and blame externalization” (Ali et al., 2009, 
p.758), cruelty, lack of affect, remorse and empathy, impulsivity and aggression, 
manipulativeness and poor behavioural control (Ali et al., 2009; Blair et al., 2001; 
Essau, Sasagawa, & Frick, 2006) and are linked to, but meaningfully different from, 
CU traits (Barry et al., 2000).  
Psychopathic traits are considered to persist across the lifespan with adults 
featuring these traits committing more crimes, receiving more convictions and 
spending more time in prison than individuals without them (Hare, 1993). There are 
suggestions though that psychopathic traits in adults have their roots in childhood (Ali 
et al., 2009) and are highly heritable (Braun, Léveillé, & Guimond, 2008). The early 
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manifestation of psychopathic traits indicates a need to think about psychopathy in 
developmental terms (Blair, 1995); a need met by the discussion of morality and 
empathy in relation to personality traits.  
It has been found that children and adults with psychopathic traits are less 
likely to make the moral/conventional distinction (Fisher & Blair, 1998) have deficits 
in stress management and psychosocial functioning (Ali et al., 2009) as well as a 
more severe, violent pattern of antisocial behaviour which is more resistant to 
intervention (Barry et al., 2000). More broadly Ali and Chamorro-Premuzic (2010) 
examined the relationship between empathy and psychopathic traits finding a negative 
association between the two. Blair identified a link between psychopathic traits in 
children and poor performance on the moral/conventional distinction task. 
Specifically, these children treated conventional rules as though they were moral 
rules. Higher levels of psychopathic traits were found to be related to poorer moral 
emotion attribution and these children were less likely to attribute moral emotions, 
specifically guilt, sympathy and fear, to characters in stories designed to elicit such a 
response (Blair, 1997a; Blair et al., 1995). In 2001, Blair, Monson and Frederickson 
found further evidence for this relationship finding that the moral/conventional 
distinction task and welfare reasoning was related to scores on measures of 
psychopathy.  
Chandler and Moran (1990) examined the interaction between psychopathy, 
delinquency (the behavioural aspect of psychopathy) and moral reasoning and found 
that delinquent adolescents showed delays in moral maturity generally, and cognitive 
measures of moral understanding and decision making more specifically. This led 
Chandler and Moran (1990) to conclude that it is the more affective aspect of 
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conscience, moral motivation, that predicts psychopathy. Fisher and Blair, in 1998, 
found that psychopathy was not related to children’s ability to make judgements about 
rule permissibility indicating that children with both high and low levels of 
psychopathic traits have a good understanding of social rules by this stage just a 
difference in their ability to determine why such rules are in place. Holmqvist (2008) 
found that psychopathy was related to a decreased awareness of shame, a moral 
emotion.  
Follow-up Research Project: Child Characteristics and Moral Self Concept 
As a follow up to the study presented in Chapter 2 a second research project 
has been designed and, at the time of writing, data collection is being undertaken. The 
aims of this second study, as outlined above, focus on a more extensive examination 
of internal child characteristics which may influence the relationship between moral 
self concept development and children’s social engagement. Specifically, personality 
traits are included within this study due to the hypotheses that Machiavellianism and 
CU traits indicate a lack of moral sensitivity and, as such, are expected to impact 
children’s development of a moral self concept.  
For the planned study a new measure was created to assess Machiavellian 
traits in children via a self-report tool which will be compared and grounded using a 
teacher and parent report of such traits. Repacholi and colleagues (Repacholi, 
Slaughter, Pritchard, & Gibbs, 2011) developed the Machiavellian Rating Scale for 
Young Children (MRS) a 12-item scale also used by Kerig and Stellwagen (2010) to 
measure Machiavellian traits in children under the age of nine and has been used with 
test children as young as four (Repacholi et al., 2011). The MRS was originally 
designed to be completed by the child's teacher but for the current study was 
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redesigned, in consultation with Virginia Slaughter, as a child report, forced-choice 
puppet interview such as was used in the first study.  
The 12 original items – each corresponding to a feature of Machiavellianism – 
were split into two factors: attitudes and behaviours as outlined by V. Slaughter 
(personal correspondence). Four features fell into an attitudes factor, four into a 
behaviour factor and four into both. One puppet item was created for each feature in 
each factor resulting in 16 items (features that corresponded to both attitudes and 
behaviours were designed an item for each facet; see Table 9) 
For the new study items were re-structured around a puppet interview format – 
one high Machiavellian item and one low Machiavellian matched item. For example 
the feature ‘seeks popularity’ was transformed into: “I think it is important that lots of 
people like me” and “I think it is important to have a really good friend”. These items 
were presented to children in the same format as outlined for the moral self concept 
puppet interview in study one using a laptop and video.  
Preliminary findings within a small sample of children aged five to eight years 
suggest that this measure has good reliability and is showing the expected patterns 
with teacher report measures of Machiavellian traits, behaviour and moral self 
concept. At the time of writing however there is not sufficient data collected to make 
a claim regarding the usefulness of this measure and the possible role that 
Machiavellian traits may be playing in the developmental trajectory of moral self 
concept.  
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Table 9: Categories and Features of the MRS scale 
Is#self#absorbed# I#think#that#I#am#one#of#the#most#special#people#I#know#(a)#
I#think#that#everyone#is#special,#we’re#just#different#(a)#
Understands#
Social#Hierarchies#
I#think#that#some#kids#in#my#class#are#more#important#than#others#(a)#
I#don't#think#it#matters#who#has#the#most#friends#(a)#
Seeks#Popularity# I#think#it#is#important#that#lots#of#people#like#me#(a)##
I#think#it#is#important#to#have#a#really#good#friend#(a)#
Is#out#for#number#
one#
I#think#other#people#should#help#me#do#what#I#want#to#do#(a)##
Sometimes#I#think#it#is#important#to#do#what#other#people#want#to#do#
(a)#
Is#trusting## You#can#rely#on#most#people,#usually#people#can#be#trusted#(b)#
You#have#to#be#careful#who#you#rely#on#because#most#people#can't#be#
trusted#(b)#
A#flatterer# I#say#nice#things#about#people#so#they’ll#help#me#(b)#
I#say#nice#things#about#people#so#they#will#feel#good#(b)#
Tends#to#put#
others’#needs#
before#their#own#
If#someone#else#needs#something#I#am#using#they#should#wait#until#I#am#
finished#(b)#
If#I#wanted#to#use#something#I#would#check#that#everyone#got#a#fair#go#
to#use#it#(b)#
Will#use#any#
means#to#achieve#
what#they#want#
It#makes#me#angry#when#someone#stops#me#doing#what#I#want#to#do#(b)#
Sometimes#you#have#to#stop#what#you#are#doing#because#it#is#hurting#
someone#else#(b)#
Lies#if#cornered# It#is#okay#to#tell#a#lie#so#you#won't#get#into#trouble#(a)#
It's#not#okay#to#lie#even#if#you’re#going#to#get#in#trouble#(a)#
If#I'm#in#trouble#I#almost#never#lie#to#get#out#of#trouble#(b)#
If#I'm#in#trouble#I#often#lie#to#get#out#of#trouble#(b)#
Is#manipulative# I#think#it#is#okay#to#use#other#people#to#get#what#I#want,#even#if#I#have#to#
trick#them#(a)#
I#think#it's#okay#to#ask#other#people#to#help#you#but#you#shouldn’t#trick#
them#(a)#
Sometimes#I#trick#people#to#get#them#to#do#what#I#want#(b)#
I#rarely#trick#people#to#get#them#to#help#me#(b)#
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Has#a#sense#of#
right#and#wrong#
It#is#only#important#to#do#the#right#thing#and#be#good#when#someone#
else#is#watching#(a)##
It#is#important#to#do#the#right#thing#and#be#good#even#if#no#one#else#is#
watching#(a)#
I#usually#only#behave#myself#when#someone#is#watching#me#(b)#
I#usually#behave#myself#even#if#no#one#is#watching#(b)#
Is#generous# I#don't#enjoy#sharing#my#things#with#other#people#(a)##
I#really#like#to#share#and#help#people#(a)#
I#usually#like#to#keep#my#nice#toys#to#play#with#myself#(b)#
I#usually#like#to#share#my#nice#things#and#play#with#them#with#other#kids#
(b)#
Note: (a) indicates an attitude item, (b) indicates a behavioural item 
 
This study is ongoing and incorporates both this new measure of child self 
identified Machiavellian traits and both parent and teacher reports of these traits as 
well as social engagement, empathy and moral understanding tasks. It also 
encompasses a wider age range accessing a younger cohort of children from 
kindergarten to year two. This study is proposed to answer some of the questions 
raised by the first study and to extend the research by widening the reporter pool and 
examine in more detail the internal child factors which may influence the interaction 
between social engagement and moral self concept. It has already been seen that child 
characteristics such as timidity affect their behaviour and moral sensitivity and it is 
hypothesised that these personality traits, Machiavellianism and CU/psychopathy, 
indicators of possible dysfunction in empathic ability, will prove to be hindrances to 
the healthy development of conscience and their resulting wellbeing and social 
conduct. If this is accurate it suggests that despite the possibility of informing teachers 
about the ways to encourage conscience development there may be factors that we are 
less able to influence.  
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It is important to understand the ways in which conscience develops within 
childhood in order to understand why some children engage positively with their 
social environment and others disregard widely held conventions and moral 
guidelines without apparent concern. Children’s behaviour impacts not only them 
selves but also those around them and their own general wellbeing into adulthood. In 
order to create an environment in which a child can develop an understanding of self 
which fosters positive social engagement we must understand how such an 
understanding develops and the features which may help or hinder this development.  
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Appendix B: Materials 
 
Social Skills Rating System (Gresham & Elliott, 1990) 
Social Skills 
1. Controls temper in conflict situations with peers. (S)  
2. Introduces herself or himself to new people without being told. (A) 
3. Appropriately questions rules that may be unfair. (A)  
4. Compromises in conflict situations by changing own ideas to reach agreement. (S)  
5. Responds appropriately to peer pressure. (S)  
6. Says nice things about himself or herself when appropriate. (A)  
7. Invites others to join in activities. (A) 
8. Uses free time in an acceptable way. (C)  
9. Finishes class assignments within time limits. (C)  
10. Makes friends easily. (A)  
11. Responds appropriately to teasing by peers. (S)  
12. Controls temper in conflict situations with adults. (S)  
13. Receives criticism well. (S)  
14. Initiates conversations with peers. (A)  
15. Uses time appropriately while waiting for help. (C)  
16. Produces correct schoolwork. (C)  
17. Appropriately tells you when he or she thinks you have treated him or her unfairly. (A)  
18. Accepts peers' ideas for group activities. (S)  
19. Gives compliments to peers. (A)  
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20. Follows your directions. (C)  
21. Puts work materials or school property away. (C)  
22. Cooperates with peers without prompting. (S)  
23. Volunteers to help peers with classroom tasks. (A)  
24. Joins ongoing activity or group without being told to do so. (A)  
25. Responds appropriately when pushed or hit by other children. (S)  
26 Ignores peer distractions when doing class work. (C)  
27. Keeps desk clean and neat without being reminded. (C)  
28. Attends to your instructions. (C)  
29 Easily makes transition from one classroom activity to another. (C)  
30. Gets along with people who are different. (S) 
C = Cooperation subscale; A = Agreeableness subscale; S = Self-control subscale  
 
Problem behaviours  
1. Fights with others. (E) 
2. Has low self-esteem. (I) 
3. Threatens or bullies others. (E) 
4. Appears lonely. (I)  
5. Is easily distracted. (H) 
6. Interrupts conversations of others. (H) 
7. Disturbs ongoing activities. (H) 
8. Shows anxiety about being with a group of children. (I)  
9. Is easily embarrassed. (I) 
10 Doesn't listen to what others say. (H)  
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11. Argues with others. (E)  
12. Talks back to adults when corrected. (E)  
13. Gets angry easily. (E)  
14. Has temper tantrums. (E)  
15. Likes to be alone. (I)  
16. Acts sad or depressed. (I)  
17. Acts impulsively. (H)  
18. Fidgets or moves excessively. (H) 
E = Externalising subscale, I = Internalising subscale, H = Hyperactivity subscale Threatens 
or bullies others 
 
Social Maturity Scale (Peterson et al., 2007) 
1 very much less mature than the average child of this age  
2 less mature than the average child of this age  
3 a little less mature than the average child this age  
4 about average for a child this age  
5 a little more mature than the average child this age  
6 more mature than the average child this age  
7 very much more mature than the average child this age 
 
1. The child’s skill and willingness to make social overtures, join groups, or welcome others 
into own activities 
2. The child’s skill at asserting him/herself appropriately to express opinions or convince 
peers. 
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3. The child’s leadership skills with peers.  
4. The maturity of the child’s everyday modes of playing sociably with peers. 
5. The child’s skills for coping with peers who frustrate or interfere with the group’s goals 
and activities 
6. The child’s ability to understand the needs and interests of peers who differ from the norm 
7. The overall maturity of the child’s social skills 
 
Teacher-rated Impulsivity Scale (White et al., 1994) 
1. Fails to finish thing he/she starts 
2. Is impulsive or acts without thinking  
3. Demands must be met immediately  
4. Talks out of turn 
5. Wants to have things right away  
6. Is impatient 
 
Social Cognitive Understanding Task example (Pons, Harris, & De Rosnay, 2004) 
1. This is Molly. Molly’s mother has given her a packet of lollies. Molly loves to eat lollies! 
Molly puts her packet of lollies on the table and goes for a walk.  
2. While Molly is outside, Jessica decides to play a trick on her.  
3. Jessica takes all the lollies out of the packet…  
4. and replaces them with beans!  
5. Then Jessica puts the packet back on the table just as Molly left it.  
 
Control Question 1: Does Molly like lollies?  
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Control Question 2: What’s really in the packet? 
 
6. Molly comes back from her walk and she’s very hungry. She sees her packet of lollies on 
the table. 
 
Target-emotion question: how does Molly feel when she first looks at the packet of lollies on 
the table but before she eats some food from it?  
 
Target FB Question: What does Molly think is inside the packet before she opens it? 
 
Self concept Puppet items (Eder, 1990) 
Left Hand Puppet (Sam) Right Hand Puppet (Alex) 
I like computer games. I don’t like computer games. 
I don’t like pizza. I like pizza. 
I like to watch other people fight. I don’t like to watch other people fight. 
Some days nothing can make me grumpy. Some days everything makes me grumpy. 
I don't think it's fun to scare people. I think it’s fun to scare people. 
When new people come to my house, I don't show 
them my toys. 
When new people come to my house, I show them my 
toys. 
I cry when I get upset. I don't cry when I get upset. 
People don't want to be around me. People want to be around me. 
I don’t like to climb on things that are high. I like to climb on things that are high. 
I think it's fun when our car goes really fast. I don’t like it when our car goes really fast. 
When I see something scary on TV, I don’t cover my 
eyes. When I see something scary on TV, I cover my eyes. 
I don't get scared a lot. I get scared a lot. 
I don’t like to have people look at me. I like it when people look at me. 
When I hear a big thunderstorm, I like to go to the 
window to see the lightening. 
When I hear a big thunderstorm, I don’t like to go to 
the window to see the lightning. 
I don’t like to do what my friends tell me to do. I like to do what my friends tell me to do. 
I care about doing a really good job on everything I 
do. 
I don't care about doing a really good job on 
everything I do. 
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I don’t like to tease people. I like to tease people. 
I like to boss people around. I don't like to boss people around. 
I share toys with kids I don’t know. I don't share toys with kids I don’t know. 
I get mad a lot. I don’t get mad a lot. 
I’m a good kid. I’m not a good kid. 
I don’t think it’s fun to hang upside-down on the 
monkey bars. 
I think that it would be fun to hang upside-down on 
the monkey bars. 
People never say mean things to me. People always say mean things to me. 
I get sad a lot. I don't get sad a lot. 
Not many things make me upset. A lot of things make me upset. 
I would play with a new kid in my school. I wouldn’t play with a new kid in my school. 
 
Moral Self Concept Items (Kochanska et al., 1994) 
Left Hand Puppet (Sam) Right Hand Puppet (Alex) 
I like ice cream. I don't like ice cream. 
I don’t tell my parents when I do something wrong I tell my parents when I do something wrong. 
It makes me feel a lot better when my parents forgive 
me for doing something 
I don’t care if my parents forgive me for doing 
something 
Sometimes, I unwrap my birthday presents a little bit 
to peek I don’t unwrap my birthday presents to peek 
I don’t feel bad when I break something or spill 
something. 
I usually feel bad when I break something or spill 
something. 
It upsets me when other people do something wrong. I don't mind when other people do something wrong. 
I hide it when I break something. I tell someone if I break something. 
I still try to do a good job if I have a really hard chore 
If I have a really hard chore, I sometimes do a messy 
job 
If I spill something on the floor, I clean it up. If I spill something on the floor, I don't clean it up. 
When I do something bad, I worry about it for a long 
time. 
When I do something bad, I don't really worry that 
much. 
If my mum is mad at me because I did something 
wrong, I don't really care.  
If my mum is mad at me because I did something 
wrong, I hate it.  
It doesn’t really bother me when someone tells me I 
made a mistake. It upsets me when someone tells me I made a mistake. 
When I remember a time I got in trouble for doing 
something wrong, I feel bad all over again. 
When I remember a time I got in trouble for doing 
something wrong, I don't feel bad anymore. 
I don’t care when I do something bad. When I do something bad, I get really upset. 
If my parents tell me not to do something, I won’t do 
it. 
If my parents tell me not to do something, I still 
sometimes do it. 
When I do something bad and my mum is upset, I When I do something bad and my mum is upset, I don't 
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really want us to make up. mind. 
When I do something wrong, sometimes I get a funny 
feeling in my tummy.  
When I do something wrong, I don't get a funny 
feeling in my tummy.  
If I broke a friend’s toy, I wouldn’t give them one of 
mine.  
If I broke a friend’s toy, I would give them one of 
mine.  
I don’t care if other kids get in trouble. I try to stop other kids from getting in trouble. 
I remember what my parents say not to do, and I 
really try not to do it I forget what I’m not supposed to do 
I sometimes break the rules when my mum can’t see 
me.  I usually follow the rules even if my mum can’t see me.  
When I am about to do something I’m not supposed 
to, I really try to stop myself 
When I am about to do something I’m not supposed 
to, I go ahead and do it 
I don’t care if someone breaks a rule It bothers me if someone breaks a rule 
When I do something wrong, I tell someone.  When I do something wrong, I keep it a secret. 
I don’t care if my friends break the rules in my house 
I get mad at my friends if they break the rules in my 
house 
When I play with other kids, I don’t care if they do 
something bad 
When I play with other kids, I try to make sure they 
follow the rules 
If I see one of my friends be mean to another person I 
get upset with them 
If I see one of my friends be mean to another person I 
don’t get upset with them 
I don’t feel bad for doing something wrong if my 
parents have forgiven me 
I sometimes feel bad even after my parents have 
forgiven me for doing something wrong 
I don’t try and fix things I break I try to fix things I break 
 
Bryant Empathy Puppet Items (Bryant, 1982) 
Left Hand Puppet (Sam) Right Hand Puppet (Alex) 
I like lollies I don’t like lollies 
I don’t ever feel like crying when I hear a song. Some songs make me so sad I feel like crying.  
Seeing a boy who is crying makes me feel like crying  Seeing a boy who is crying doesn’t make me feel like 
crying 
I don’t get upset when I see a boy being hurt  I get upset when I see a boy being hurt 
Seeing a girl who is crying doesn’t make me feel like 
crying 
Seeing a girl who is crying makes me feel like crying  
It makes me sad to see a girl who can't find anyone to 
play with 
It doesn’t make me sad to see a girl who can’t find 
anyone to play with. 
I get upset when I see a girl being hurt I don’t get upset when I see a girl being hurt 
It makes me sad to see a boy who can't find anyone to 
play with 
It doesn’t make me sad to see a boy who can't find 
anyone to play with 
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Appendix C: Assumption testing 
The normality of the distribution of each measure was assessed using the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic. As can be seen in Table 10 most variables violated the 
assumption of normality and only verbal ability score, SSRS social skills and timidity at six 
years displayed normality. Despite this, to ensure a more meaningful interpretation of results, 
the original non-normal, non-transformed data was used for analysis as recommended by 
Grayson (2004). It is understood as reasonable for most of these measures to be non-normal 
and skewed towards the lower or higher end of the scale. For example, the SDQ conduct 
problems scale can be used to identify children with clinical levels of behavioural problems 
the incidence of which, within a non-clinical sample, should be low, resulting in skewed data.  
 
Table 10: Testing the Assumption of normality 
Measure# Skewness#
coefficient#
Kurtosis#
coefficient!
p#value#
At#6#years#
Age#in#months# K.14# K.78# .01#
Verbal#ability# .14# K.24# .08#
Timidity# K.05# K.54# .07#
Agreeableness# K.76# 1.58# <#.001#
Negative#affect# 1.33# 2.25# <#.001#
Empathic#sadness# K.12# K.81# .01#
MSC# K.88# .52# <#.001#
Guilt# K.25# K.50# <#.001#
SSRS#social#skills## K.26# K1.11# .20#
SSRS#problem#behaviours# .75# K.39# .01#
SMat# .28# .41# <#.001#
TRIS# # # <#.001#
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At#7#years#
Verbal#ability# K.26# K.13# .18#
Timidity# .24# K.65# <#.001#
Agreeableness# K.44# K.27# <#.001#
Negative#affect# 1.29# 1.78# <#.001#
Empathic#sadness# K.08# K1.02# .02#
MSC# K.82# .03# <#.001#
Guilt# K.39# K.50# .001#
SDQ#conduct#problems# 1.49# 1.24# <#.001#
SMat# .07# K.32# <#.01#
SSRS#Social#skills# K.56# K.61# .20#
TRIS# 1.40# .89# <#.001#
 
There appeared to be a number of outliers on a selection of measures (see Table 11). 
Each one was examined. Bar participant 12608 who showed an unusually low vocabulary 
score at seven years all other measures should to a degree be expected to show outliers and it 
was deemed inappropriate to delete any of the other participants for this reason. Participant 
12608 was retained as they did not score unusually on vocabulary at the age of 6 however 
this was kept in mind during analysis of the data.  
 
Table 11: Examination of outliers 
ID# Measure#
10107# Conduct#Problems#at#7yrs#
10708# Negative#Affect#at#7yrs#
10908# MSC#at#6yrs#
TRIS#at#6yrs#
12608# TOLD#at#7yrs#
13008# Negative#Affect#at#6yrs#
SMat#at#6yrs#
Negative#Affect#at#7yrs#
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20107# TRIS#at#6yrs#
20108# Conduct#Problems#at#7yrs#
20308# Conduct#Problems#at#7yrs#
20507# TRIS#at#6yrs#
Conduct#Problems#at#7yrs#
20508# TRIS#at#6yrs#
Conduct#Problems#at#7yrs#
20607# Agreeableness#at#6yrs#
20908# MSC#at#6yrs#
TRIS#at#6yrs#
Negative#Affect#at#7yrs#
Conduct#Problems#at#7yrs#
TRIS#at#7yrs#
21007# Negative#Affect#at#7yrs#
TRIS#at#7yrs#
21208# Negative#Affect#at#7yrs#
21408# SMat#at#6yrs#
21608# Conduct#Problems#at#7yrs#
21908# TRIS#at#7yrs#
Note: measure indicates the scale on which the participant appears to be an outlier 
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Appendix D: SPSS analysis 
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Timidity at 6 and 7: 
 
Agreeableness at 6 and 7: 
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Negative affect at 6 and 7: 
 
Guilt at 6 and 7: 
 
MSC no guilt at 6 and 7: 
 
Empathic sadness at 6 and 7: 
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